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STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED CASES
This matter was originally appealed and heard by the Utah Court of Appeals in
2005. Case No. 20050246-CA {Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App.
2005). Following the Utah Court of Appeals decision, this Court granted Arby's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari. Case No. 20060061-SC (Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Transportation.,
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers F)). Following the decision in Ivers I, the case was
remanded to the district court to determine the amount of Arby's severance damages.
Upon a ruling by the district court, which eliminated Arby's right to pursue its severance
damages claim, the matter once again came before the Utah Supreme Court in UDOT v.
Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) ("Ivers IF). Following the ruling in Ivers II, which held
the district court had failed to follow the Court's mandate in Ivers I, the case was
remanded to the district court and was eventually tried before a jury. The non-unanimous
jury denied Arby's any severance damages for loss of view and this appeal was filed.
While the present appeal was pending, the Court made a ruling in Utah
Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2012),
which expressly overturned Ivers I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102Q.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Appellants are James Ivers5 Katherine G. Havas, and P and F Food Services,
referred to herein collectively as "Arby's."

Appellee is Utah Department of
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Transportation, referred to herein as "UDOT."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are stated as follows:
ISSUE:

Should the jury verdict be reversed and this case remanded in light
of the ruling in Admiral Beverage, which overturned this Court's
previous ruling in this matter in Ivers I?

ISSUE:

Should the verdict be reversed on the basis the jury instructions were
based upon Ivers I, which this Court has ruled was "wrongly
decided" and "unworkable?"

ISSUE:

Should the district court be reversed on the basis it allowed UDOT's
appraiser to render opinions that Arby's had no damages for loss of
view?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for correctness, granting no
deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73
P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75
(Utah 2003); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most
supportive of the verdict and a jury verdict will be upset only upon a showing that the
evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would
not differ on the outcome of the case. Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 210 P.3d 977, 985
(Utah App. 2009).
Trial court decisions determining the admissibility of expert testimony are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
2
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
•

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation."
•

Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation."
•

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-6-571:

The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess:
*

*

*

*

*

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a
part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
Arby's, through multiple appeals and a jury trial, has sought an award of

severance damages for the reduction in fair market value of real property as a result of
UDOT's construction project, specifically the elevation of U.S. 89 over Shepard Lane in
Farmington, Utah. This Court ruled in Ivers I that because UDOT had taken property
from Arby's, if that taking was necessary for its project, Arby's could seek severance
damages for loss of view, even if the portion of the project obstructing Arby's view
wasn't built upon the portion of the property that was taken and severed from the
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remaining property. However, this Court would not then allow severance damages based
upon loss of visibility or any other specific factor.
II.

Course of Proceedings
Following remand to the district court, rather than proceeding to determine Arby's

severance damages for loss of view, the trial court granted UDOT's Motion to
Alter/Amend Order, which had the effect of extinguishing Arby's severance damages
claim. That ruling was appealed in Ivers II, where this Court ruled the district court had
failed to follow the mandate in Ivers I. The case was remanded again to the district court
for a trial on the amount of severance damages for loss of view to which Arby's was
entitled.
III.

Disposition in the Lower Court
Based upon the ruling in Arby's /, the parties attempted to construct jury

instructions, which limited Arby's severance damages claim to loss of view only, rather
than allowing the traditional diminution in value approach. The case was tried on April
13-15, 2010. A non-unanimous jury awarded no severance damages based upon loss of
view, despite the undisputed fact the view from Arby's property was obstructed. This
appeal was filed, and then stayed, pending the outcome of the Admiral Beverage case.
This Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage reversed the restrictive severance damages
analysis in Ivers /, upon which this case was tried.

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The well-known underlying facts of this case are set forth in the parties' prior
briefing in Ivers I and Ivers II, as well as the Utah Supreme Court's rulings in those
respective appeals. The underlying facts of this matter are also reviewed and summarized
in the Admiral Beverage opinion. The facts related to the present appeal are as follows:
1.

Following this Court's ruling in Ivers II, the case was remanded to the

district court on or about August 21, 2009. Opinion, R. at p. 524, et seq. (the record on
appeal is referenced to herein as "R").1
2.

Arby's filed a Motion in Limine on or about March 31, 2010, seeking to

limit the testimony of UDOT's appraiser, J. Phillip Cook ("Mr. Cook") and strike
portions of his appraisal report on the basis it concludes Arby's suffered no damages.
Motion in Limine and Memorandum, R. at p. 702-722.
3.

The district court, on April 12, 2010, denied Arby's Motion in Limine.

Motion to Strike Portions of Mr. Cook's Appraisal Report. Ruling, R. at pp. 830-834.
4.

A jury trial was conducted from April 13 to 15, 2010.

5.

The following jury instructions were given, based upon the district court's

and the parties' understanding of Ivers I and other severance damages cases:
31. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the
State of Utah for the purpose of condemning and acquiring private
property of the defendant landowners for a public purpose. The party
commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah Department
1

Certain sections of the record are not paginated correctly. The Court's conclusion
appears at page 10 of its Opinion. The Opinion starts at p. 524 of the record.
5
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of Transportation, and the property owners, known as the defendants, are
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in
this case include the value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property.
33. TAKING
In this case, the condemnation or "taking" involves a parcel of land
which was condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs
project to expand and elevate U.S. Highway 89 ovef Shepard Lane in
Farmington, Utah.
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public
highway, and a reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent
public highway and a view from their property.
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in
the "after condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of
view, then you may award damages based on the reduced value of the
remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain and not
contingent, remote or speculative.
A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by
passing traffic and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of
visibility by or exposure to passing traffic. (Emphasis added).
34. LOSS OF VIEW
In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a
legal right to recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss
of view is to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view,
created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market value of
the residue of the property.
35. DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMANENT INJURY
The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in
the fair market value of the land immediately before and after the injury.
This is called diminution in value.
36. FAIR MARKET VALUE
Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of
money that land would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with
a reasonable time allowed in which to find a buyer with knowledge of all
the uses and purposes to which the land was adapted.
In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer
would have paid a willing seller in an arms-length transaction with both
parties being fully informed concerning all of the advantages and
6
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disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any
compulsion to buy or sell.
39. JUST COMPENSATION
The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property
because of public necessity. In this case, just compensation must be paid
for the value of the loss of view from the defendants' property. Just
compensation includes the fair market value of the loss of view from the
defendants' property.
40. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES
In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid
to the defendants in the following manner: You will decide the value of
the loss of view from the defendants' property by determining the fair
market value as of December 30, 2002.
Jury Instructions, R. at pp. 848-863.
6.

Mr. Cook, was permitted to testify at trial the Arby's suffered no damages

for loss of view. Portions of Mr. Cook's trial testimony transcript are attached hereto as
Addendum B hereto.
7.

Following deliberations, a non-unanimous jury awarded no severance

damages to Arby's based upon loss of view. Special Verdict, R. at p. 864.
8.

Judgment was entered on May 4, 2010, awarding no damages to Arby's.

Judgment on Verdict, R. at pp. 868-70.
9.

Following entry of judgment, Arby's filed a Notice of Appeal. Notice of

Appeal, R. at pp. 872-73.
10.

While the present appeal was pending, the Admiral Beverage case, which

sought to reverse Ivers /, came up for briefing and oral argument.

7
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11.

Arby's filed a Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule asking for a stay of the

present appeal pending the outcome of Admiral Beverage on the basis the ruling in
Admiral Beverage could have a direct impact on this appeal. Motion to Stay Briefing
Schedule, Addendum C hereto.
12.

This Court entered a stay of the proceedings in the present appeal pending

the ruling in Admiral Beverage, Order to Stay Briefing, Addendum D hereto.
13.

Arby's was allowed to submit an amicus brief in Admiral Beverage, in

support of the contention that Ivers I should be overturned. Amicus Brief, Addendum E
hereto.
14.

This Court issued its ruling in Admiral Beverage on October 18, 2011,

overturning Ivers I.
15.

Arby's filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and Remand to District

Court in this appeal seeking a summary reversal based upon Admiral Beverage. Motion
for Summary Disposition, Addendum F hereto.
16.

On May 11, 2012, this Court entered an order providing:

This matter is before the Court on Appellants' motion for summary
reversal. The motion is deferred until plenary presentation on the merits.
The stay imposed in response to the filing of the motion is lifted. As to the
arguments raised in connection with the motion the parties may choose to
rest on the pleadings they have submitted or may address the matter as they
see fit in briefing and at argument....
Order on Motion for Summary Disposition, Addendum G hereto.

8
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SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT
After its long history in the appellate court system, the jury trial on Arby's
severance damages claim was finally conducted on April 13-15, 2010. Based upon the
narrow ruling in Ivers 7, the sole issue to be tried was severance damages based upon loss
of view due to the obstruction constructed by UDOT. A non-unanimous jury awarded
Arby's no severance damages based upon loss of view, despite the undisputed fact view
from the subject property was obstructed.

This outcome highlights the serious

constitutional problems with the Ivers I decision and its unworkability in application.
While the present appeal was pending, the Utah Supreme Court, in Admiral
Beverage, expressly overturned Ivers L Based upon the fact the prior ruling in this case
has been overturned, the jury verdict, which was based upon wrongly-decided and
unworkable law, should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings to determine Arby's constitutionally and statutorily provided right to recover
severance damages.
With respect to the trial itself, the jury instructions were inconsistent,
contradictory and confusing, in everyone's attempt to craft instructions that were
consistent with Ivers I as well as other Utah precedent regarding severance damages.
Moreover, Arby's contends UDOT's appraiser, Mr. Cook, was improperly
allowed to give opinions that the loss of view Arby's suffered had absolutely no value.
His opinions and testimony are out of line with this Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage,
which discussed the problems in attempting to isolate and distinguish between
9
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protectable and non-protectable property rights.

The district court should not have

permitted Mr. Cook to give his opinions in the first place because they were based upon
inadmissible hearsay, reliance upon lay opinions irrelevant to this case, and reliance upon
evidence not of the type used by appraisers to form opinions.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE
CASE REMANDED BASED UPON THE RULING IN ADMIRAL
BEJ^ERAGE, WHICH OVERTURNED THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT'S PRIOR RULING (IVERS I) IN THIS MATTER
Arby's filed this appeal after the jury determined to award no severance damages
based upon the isolated loss of view factor.

Essentially, Arby's right to just

compensation as guaranteed constitutionally and pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6571 has remained elusive.
While this appeal was pending, the Admiral Beverage appeal had already been
filed and was pending.

In Admiral Beverage, the Utah Supreme Court requested

supplemental briefing from the parties on the question of whether Ivers /, the previous
appeal in this very case, should be overruled on constitutional grounds. Pursuant to Ivers
I, Arby's was limited at trial to seeking severance damages based upon loss of view
caused by the elevated U.S. 89 UDOT constructed, rather than the diminution in value of
the remnant property as a result of the taking of the severed portion. In Ivers /, the court
held "[wjhen land is condemned as part of a single project - even if the view-impairing
structure itself is built on property other than that which was condemned - if the use of
10
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the condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole.'5 Ivers I,
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007).
Due to the potential the Ivers I rule could be modified, or even overturned, Arby's
sought to have the Court stay this appeal ("Ivers III"). Arby's argued the stay should be
imposed because this Court's decision in Admiral Beverage would have a direct impact
on Ivers III. See Addendum C hereto. Arby's Motion to Stay Briefing was granted and
the proceedings in Ivers III were put on hold pending the ruling in Admiral Beverage. At
least implicitly, by imposing the stay, this Court agreed that Admiral Beverage could
directly impact Ivers III. This Court ultimately overturned Ivers I and the stay in this
matter remained in effect while UDOT attempted unsuccessfully to have the Admiral
Beverage ruling reconsidered.
Following this Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage that Ivers I had been wrongly
decided, Arby's filed a Motion for Summary Disposition asking the Court to reverse the
outcome in the lower court and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to
Admiral Beverage ruling. Rather than deciding the Motion for Summary Disposition, the
Court entered an order deferring the matter until plenary presentation on the merits and
advised the parties that they could rest on the pleadings or address the matter further as
they see fit in their briefing and at oral argument. See Addendum G hereto. Arby's
hereby supplements its Motion for Summary Disposition and adds the following plenary
presentation:

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court, in Admiral Beverage, determined the Ivers I holding was "too
restrictive to accord the full protection of the Utah Constitution and is inconsistent with
both Utah statutes and [ ] prior case law." Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 211. The
Court held Ivers I was "wrongly decided" {id. at 214) and overturned its prior ruling in
this case. Because Arby's has heretofore been denied its constitutional and statutory
rights to recover severance damages, and in light of its Court's ruling in Admiral
Beverage, Arby's asks the Court to reverse the judgment in the district court and allow
Arby's to retry its case for severance damages based upon diminution of value of the
remnant property.
It would also constitute a manifest injustice if Arby's is not permitted to pursue
severance damages under Admiral Beverage, which expressly held the prior Ivers /ruling
was wrong. As this Court held in Admiral Beverage, it is unprecedented that a property
owner have to seek severance damages based upon the isolation of artificial distinctions
between what is considered protected and non-protected property rights.

Admiral

Beverage, 275 P.3d at 217-218 and 220. Arby's should be permitted to pursue remedies
afforded by the constitution and Utah's condemnation statutes as discussed in Admiral
Beverage.
POINT 2
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BASED UPON IVERS I,
WERE CONFUSING, CONTRADICTORY, AND
INCONSISTENT, LEADING TO AN AWARD OF NO
DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF VIEW
What occurred at trial vividly supports this Court's recognition in Admiral
12
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Beverage that the Ivers I rule is unworkable. See 275 P.3d at 219-220. At trial, the
parties and the district court; attempted to prepare jury instructions that were consistent
with Ivers L However, the task was made difficult because of varying interpretations of
the restrictive Ivers I holding and because of other well-settled precedent that conflicted
with aspects of Ivers I For example, other important condemnation cases that remained
good law in Utah following Ivers I include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526
P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); Utah Dept of Tramp, v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987);
Utah State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others, including
cases relied upon by the Court in its Admiral Beverage opinion.
Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in
condemnation cases remained intact following Ivers I. These principles became confused
in an attempt to follow Ivers I.

As has now been settled by Admiral Beverage,

compensation for severance damages is the difference in the fair market value of the
owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See also State v. Cooperative
Sec. Corp, of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah
1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by considering all of
the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this Court stated in
Rohan,
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value.

13
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487 P.2d at 859. See also Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 217 {quoting Weber Basin
Water Conservary Dist v. Ward, 347 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1969)).
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case revealed, the long-standing
principle set forth in Rohan and other cases had to be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I
holding that the jury could only consider loss of view in determining severance damages.
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon
Ivers I it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific
property right that was damaged, i.e. view, or whether view was a factor to consider
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the
reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No.
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from
[Arby's] property," (Jury Instructions, R. at p. 859) indicating view was to be isolated
and valued. Jury Instruction No. 33, contained the following caveat based upon Ivers I:
"A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be viewed by passing
traffic and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure
to passing traffic" (Emphasis added). Id. In other words, despite being a factor sellers
and buyers of real property would consider in valuing real property, the jury was not
permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's damages.
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway
14
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structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." Id. at p. 860. This
language attempted to reflect Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah
1974). In Miya, this Court held the obstruction in that case was to be considered in
determining severance damages. Specifically, severance damages were to be measured
"by the effect the obstruction of view, created by the structure, has upon the market value
of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d at 929. However, the definition of
market value was confusingly limited in Jury Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case
you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property." (Emphasis added). Jury Instructions, R. at p. 860. Again, using Ivers I as the
applicable law, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the
loss of view from defendant's property." Id. at p. 861 (Jury Instruction No. 39). Under
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and attempt to place upon it a
monetary value.2
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the
fair market value as of December 30, 2002." Id. at p. 61 (Jury Instruction No. 40). In
short, not only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible
task of attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions

2

In Admiral Beverage, the Court referenced the fact that the property owner's appraisers
testified it was "impossible to isolate and identify the values associated with loss of view
and visibility." 275 P.3dat219.
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caused by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into
account in valuing real property.
This Court, in Admiral Beverage, described the unworkability of Ivers I. First,
"there is no set of conventions that appraisers can readily apply when they are asked to
value a property in reference to its protected and non-protected property rights." 275
P.3d at 219. Second, when assessing real property values, appraisers normally locate and
analyze sales of comparable properties. Id. However, "comparable sales in which the
buyer and seller ignore value that can be attributed to categories of certain nonprotectable property rights is simply not available." Id. The unworkability of Ivers I is
clearly observed in the outcome of the jury trial in this matter.
POINT 3
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING UDOT'S
APPRAISER TO TESTIFY THAT ARBY'S SUFFERED
NO SEVERANCE DAMAGES
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony
UDOT's appraiser, Mr. Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Addendum B
hereto at p. 45. Prior to trial, Arby's attempted to restrict Mr. Cook's testimony through a
motion in limine based upon the contents of the Cook appraisal report that was disclosed
to Arby's. However, the district court denied that motion and permitted Mr. Cook to
testify that in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses,
Arby's had sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Mr.
16
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Cook's opinion was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated
fast-food restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses.

See,

generally, Addendum B hereto and Addendum H, which contains the underpinnings of
Mr. Cook's trial testimony.
At trial, Mr. Cook also attempted to advocate a distinction between categories of
properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is not compensable. This
is contrary to the Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage where an appraiser's attempt to
make artificial distinctions was described as rank speculation. 275 P.3d at 220. In
connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact on the value of
Arby's remnant property, Mr. Cook took the position that view only has value for certain
types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end residential
properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel rooms with
views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. Addendum B hereto, at pp.
18-20. In other words, according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I constitutional
rights are selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has
property damaged by a condemner's actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision
to continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers I, Arby's property right
was narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim, as
championed by Mr. Cook, that there was no damage for loss of view.
As already acknowledged in Admiral Beverage, the type of segregation attempted
at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents just compensation from being awarded to
17
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property owners because certain factors impacting value are disregarded and it opens the
door to the type of testimony given by Mr. Cook that a property owner need not be
compensated for loss of view, even when the causation element is satisfied. Arby's was
awarded no severance damages for loss of view although it cannot be disputed the
property's view was obstructed by UDOT's project. Zero damages does not qualify as
just compensation for damaged property, even under Ivers /, where the district court was
given the mandate to determine the amount of severance damages to which Arby's was
entitled. See Ivers 27, 218 at 586 ("[the supreme court] remanded to the district court. . .
and instructed the district court that if Arby's condemned land was essential to the
project, the court should award Arby's appropriate damages.")
Arby's, through its Motion in Limine, challenged the bases of Mr. Cook's nodamage opinion, which was ultimately given at trial, as follows:
A.

Mr. Cook's Opinions Were Based Upon Inadmissible Hearsay
Mr. Cook concluded Arby's loss of view did not negatively impact the value of

the subject real property. His opinion was based upon opinions from lay witnesses Mr.
Cook or his assistants allegedly interviewed. See Addendum E, at Exhibit "A" (Excerpts
of Mr. Cook's Summary Appraisal Report). This is problematic for numerous reasons.
First, the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court
statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), UTAH R. EviD.
Hearsay is generally inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EviD. Mr. Cook's interviews
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of lay witnesses do not meet any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803,
UTAHR.EVID.3

This Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his opinion in
part on out of court statements, "[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked in
the form of an expert opinion, would have been impermissible and potentially highly
prejudicial." Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay
evidence was not admissible at trial and the district court should have granted Arby's
Motion in Limine.
B.

Lay Witnesses are Not Qualified as Experts
While some of Mr. Cook's interviewees are named, many of them are not

identified and are only referenced vaguely and generally. For example, on page 51 of his
report, Cook says he spoke with "the managers of several fast-food restaurants...." On
page 52, he states: "We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food
chains concerning site selection criteria and view out." Addendum H hereto. Cook
identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but does not identify any of the
other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he allegedly spoke.
Moreover, insufficient information was provided concerning the background and
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value
of the subject real property. What are their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation
3

The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Mr, Cook relied upon other
parties to conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into
his appraisal. It is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along
statements they allegedly heard from others.
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of loss of view any part of their job duties? These individuals are apparently involved in
managing restaurants, but they are not real estate experts.

For example, alleged

statements of an individual named Treesa Kurtzenborn about the subject property is used
to support Mr. Cook's opinion that Arby's suffered no damage. No information was
given concerning Ms. Kurtzenborn's expertise or familiarity with the subject property,
yet she freely speculates and opines that other factors impacted the value of the subject
property more than the view obstruction. There is no foundation for such a speculative
opinion from a lay witness and no explanation for why Mr. Cook would incorporate such
a statement from a lay witness into his own expert opinions. It is the trial court's
obligation to insure that an expert witness is truly testifying as an expert and not merely
serving as a conduit through which inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United
States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 73 (1 st Cir. 2006) ("an expert witness may not simply
summarize the out-of-court statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted).
Despite Arby's objection, the district court allowed Mr. Cook to base opinions on this
purported evidence.
It is clear the lay witnesses Mr. Cook and his assistants interviewed were asked to
render opinions based upon scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702,
UTAH R. EVID. reserves such testimony to experts who have the requisite "knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education.55 Id. None of Mr. Cook's interviewees were
designated as witnesses in this matter, expert or otherwise. Lay witness opinions are
limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R. EviD., to the witness's own perception, rather
20
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than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of Mr. Cook's
interviewees was well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses and should
have been restricted by the district court.
C.

The Lay Opinions Upon Winch Mr. Cook Relied are Irrelevant
Mr. Cook's interview data was irrelevant.

As an example, he apparently

interviewed an assistant store manager of the Smith's store and representatives of a
Burger King on the east side of U.S. 89, across from the subject Arby's location. These
locations are more distant from the elevated U.S. 89 than the Arby's property. The
Smith's store is further north than the Arby's property and does not face the highest point
of the elevated U.S. 89. Additionally, Cook failed to explain how the lack of customer
complaints4 about loss of view at a grocery store (or other unrelated locations) has any
bearing on determining the loss in the fair market value of the subject property. Cook's
appraisal was replete with this kind of irrelevant material and should have been limited
by the trial court.
D.

The Material Mr. Cook Relied Upon was not of the Type Upon Which an
Appraiser Reasonably Bases Opinions
Rule 703, UTAH R. EVID. states the data upon which an expert bases his opinion

need not be admissible in evidence if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions...." Mr. Cook failed to explain that
4

Mr. Cook relied upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations
other than subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage
for loss of view. Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any
relevance in this matter, Mr. Cook laid no foundation to show that the persons
interviewed would have been the persons to whom customers would have complained.
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opinions of lay witnesses, particularly those who have no familiarity with the subject
property, are the type of facts or data upon which a licensed real estate appraiser would
reasonably rely to value property. The material, which is not admissible due to the
problems discussed above, is not of the type upon which an appraiser relies to appraise
real property. Mr. Cook's opinions should have been based upon the standard of Rule
702, UTAH R. EVID., rather than impermissible lay opinions. Therefore, Mr. Cook should
have been excluded from relying upon it and discussing it at trial.
E.

Mr. Cook's Underlying Methodology was not Disclosed
Not only did Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the qualifications of

the interviewees to render opinions, but he provided no information about the
methodology of the interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified?
How were the interviews conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to
the subject property with respect to the view issue? What questions were asked? What is
the identity of persons interviewed who are not discussed in the Cook appraisal? What
individuals were interviewed who are not mentioned in the report? What information
was obtained through the interview process that contradicts Cook's opinions? What
documentation or recordings exist of the interviews?
Arby's, based upon legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what was
referenced in the Cook appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of
those who were interviewed, asked the district court to limit the testimony.

At a

minimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAH R. EVID., the district court should have required
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all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions to be disclosed to Arby's prior to
trial. That did not occur.
F.

The District Court Failed to Exercise its Function as a Gatekeeper
Mr. Cook's opinions did not meet the standards required under Rule 702. That

Rule, in relevant part, provides:
(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialized knowledge
may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific,
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable,
(ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such
knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are
generally accepted by the relevant expert community.
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R.
EviD. is to be applied to "all expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that,
just as in federal court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper' responsibility to
screen out unreliable expert testimony." To fulfill this role, the Note advises that the trial
judge should "confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should
be "receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability."
Because Mr. Cook relied upon irrelevant hearsay opinions from lay witnesses, his
opinions were unreliable, yet the district court improperly refused to exclude such
testimony and evidence at trial.
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In short, in the wake of Admiral Beverage, Mr. Cook would have not been able to
render the opinions he rendered on behalf of UDOT at trial. Moreover, even without the
illumination provided by Admiral Beverage, the district court should not have permitted
Mr. Cook to base his opinions upon inadmissible and irrelevant evidence.
CONCLUSION
Because this case was tried under hers /, which has now been held to be wrongly
decided, Arby's will be deprived of its constitutional rights if the controlling law of
Admiral Beverage is not applied to allow further proceedings in the district court for
Arby's to be awarded severance damages.
DATED this l^y

day of June, 2012.
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

mebr

maid J. Winder
JMk W. Holt
A tthrneys for Defendants/Appellants
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P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353
randvhunter(@,utah. gov
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF'
TRANSPORTATION,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
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vs.
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS;
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,

Civil No. 020700665
Judge Michael Allphin

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on April 13,14 and 15,2010, before the Honorable Michael
Allphin of this Court. Plaintiff was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General,
and Defendants were represented by Donald Winder and John Holt. A jury of eight persons was
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action. Witnesses on behalf of both parties were sworn
and testified. After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the Court,
the jury retired to consider their verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered
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and received and the written instructions of the Court. TheS jury subsequently returned to the
Court and, through its foreman, said that theyfinda UT<III i ioi Ihr 11.unlit 1 ,md it^insi I In
Defendants as follows:
[We] find in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in
that the Defendants have failed to prove damages for diminuation
of fair market value for loss of view and we decline to award the
Defendants a monetary sum.
TOTAL AWARD

$0.00

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise aforesaid,, It Is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that James Ivers and P and F Food Services,
Defendants herein, recover from the State of Utah, no further monies; a stipulation and award of
$104,500 having been stipulated to and ordered on the 6th day of June, 2003, leaving a balance of
$0 00 < >wed by the State of Utah b> Defendants.
DATED this /f*day of

-/nAM^*
(J

2010,
'BY THE GUI-1*

MCHAELALLPHINy
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
D©TULD WINDER
JOHMHOLT
AtraqiW for Defendants
Judgment on Verdict
Davis County Civil No, 020 700665
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under the

bridge?

A,

Yes

Q.

Okay,

let's

You" v e :i n d i c a 1: e d t h a t

look at

slide

30,

11 i e d i s t a n c e s „.

showing t h e

distances.

> i I 1 i I <= • a v e r a g e r

ar e a

.1 ] ttle bit. s h y of 2 0 0 feet?
A.

Y e a h , 192 is what we m e a s u r e from t h e s t o r e , itself/

1 ,i :, the waJ 1

11 s a] : »: :>i it 65 feet from 1 :he p r o p e r t y line tc > the

wall.
Q.

Okay.

Is it r e a s o n a b l e t o r e v i e w -- to r e f e r to this

as a ' u p a r t i a l view impairment''? .
A.

C e r t a i n l y it's only a p a r t i a l view

impairment.

There's no Q.

T h e r e ' s not a t o t a l view

A.

—

impairment?

there's n o m a t e r i a l view i m p a i r m e n t i n m o s t

d i r e c t i o n s , b u t to t h e east there is a p a r t i a l v i e w impairment..
Q.

Is vi ew an important a m e n i t y for r e a l

I !i

It cai I be .

Q.

What, type of r e a l estate is view i m p o r t a n t t o ?

A.

R e s o r t hotels o v e r l o o k i n g t h e o c e a n , a v i e w would be

/ e 2 } i nip o i 1: a i t

estate?

I I i gl I e i i < :i 1: I c >me s :i i I r e - 3 o r 1: s e 1 1 :i n g s

a \ :i = i ? :i s

an a m e n i t y for which b u y e r s will p a y a p r e m i u m .
Q.

H o w about i n d u s t r i a l

properties?

A

Indi is 1:ri a 1 p r o p e r t i e s are no 1: boI igI I 1: f oi vj e w oi i1:.

Most: i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g s don't have w i n d o w s .

They're

—

they m a y h a v e a few w i n d o w s in the office area, b u t industrial
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-19buildings are typically designed for either storage where
they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well
as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't
have windows; or it's manufacturing, where they don't want
employees to be looking out the window while they' re —

while

they're working, for safety purposes.
Q.

How about the view in, visibility; is that important

to an industrial property?
A.

It can be.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

Well, some industrial businesses are —

a what we call a "showroom warehouse."

they'll have

So like a lot of home

construction materials companies like tile companies will
like to advertise and get people into their showroom.

They

are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the
homeowner's picking out the goods.

So if they can be exposed

to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that
can help their business.
Q.

Is it customary for them to put some —

their name or

some advertising on the outside of the building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Does that contribute —

that visibility contribute to

an industrial property?
A.

An industrial user that is worried about —

or is

hopeful to get some recognition from the marketplace, that's
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e x a c 1 1 y w h a t I h e y w n n 1 t . -1- -

2

Q.

It p r o v i d e s some name

recognition?

3

A.

Right, but t h e r e are a lot of i n d u s t r i a l u s e r s that
1 J I I 1 f g r o u p n f i n< 111,1. t r J a

4

d o n " t c a r e . T h i s i s s o r t < > I »i inii qin

5

users w h e r e t h e r e ' s some advantage to that

6
7

Q.

So the v i s i b i l i t y in is d i f f e r e n t than t h e

out; is that what y o u ' r e
A.
Q.

visibility

saying?

Significantly.
Okay, h o w about fast food r e s t a u r a n t s ; i s v i e w out an

important a m e n i t y to a fast food
I

disability.

It ] s not

restaurant?

II .:, wasi i 1: j i sted in 1:1 le c r i t e r i a of site

s e l e c t i o n for fast f o o d o p e r a t o r s .

It wasn't s o m e t h i n g that in

my v a r i e d d i s c u s s i o n s with i n d i v i d u a l s who are i n v o l v e d in that
f

sines s i d e n t i f i e d as ai I i ssi le .

I've a J so s t u d i e d :i 1: with

s p e c i f i c p a i r e d s a l e s suggested is not an amenity that

fast

food r e s t a u r a n t s care about.
W1 i e r e a r e f a s 1: f o o d r e s t a u. r a. i I 1: s t y p i c a J I y 1 o c a t e d ?
They are t y p i c a l l y located a l o n g freeway
cr in front of s h o p p i n g centers.
(

interchanges

Ideally, both.

Is that for their c o n v e n i e n c e ?
11ight,

it's for convenience, it's for v i s i b i l i t y ,

it's

for a c c e s s i b i l i t y .
Q.

I b e l i e v e you said fast food r e s t a u r a n t s a r e freqi ie itl}r

located at h i g h w a y / f r e e w a y
A

intersections.

They are.
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-30Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: I s i t customary t o r e v i e w

business

texts?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you review those texts in this case?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You refer yesterday to a textbook or a —

I don't know

if it's a textbook, but a book on fast food restaurants
A.

Yes, some

Q.

—

A.

Mellafanny.

Q.

—

—

—

by Mr. Milvane —

Mellafanny, okay.

Mella

—

It's easy for you to say.

Did

he note the view out as a criteria of a fast food restaurant?
MR. WINDER: Judge, I'm going to object.

We've plowed

this ground already.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection at this point.
I think you are —

I thought maybe you were just going to just

move right through, but you're covering the same thing we did
yesterday.
Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: Okay, and did you interview managers of

any of these fast food stores?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did they tell you anything different than what you

previously learned?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay, so let's move to your data.

You've conducted
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-31t h i s background,

y o u ' v e v i s i t e d 11 ie s:i 1:e a J o 1:, you v i s j 1:ed

a l o t of o t h e r s i t e s ,

y o u ' v e i n t e r v i e w e d a l o t of

people,

y o u ' v e r e a d t h e — what you c o n s i d e r a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t s on
.. t o j e c 1:

W1 I a 1: d i d y :) i i d o i I e x 1: ?

Ultimately an appraiser needs to go to the-market
to see how the market reacts.

I mean, I can talk to all these

people, I can review what's written on this, and that's pretty
darn good anecdotal evidence; but I need to go to the market,
to see if buyers and sellers transact land sales, property

10

sales on a different basis if there's a view impairing issue

11

associated with it.

12

Q.

13

time to -

1i

1!

JE 1;

15

Q.

What did you do?

16

A.

So this is a retail property,

So'all of that's just anecdotal information.

Now it's

where the rubber meets the road?
3 gl it

yes .

It's imperative in

3 ?

a p p r a i s i n g 11 i a t w e c omp a r e J :i k e k i i I d p r o p e r t i e s

18"

for retail sites, not other types of sites, but

19

or industrial or whatever.

S c• we J oo k

like office

We look at retail sites, and I foil

20

I try to find sales of view impaired si tes, and sal es of

2]

non-view impaired sites so that I could measure the difference.

22

If

i t's called "paired sales analysis," which

23

is a tech —

a quantitative technique used to identify and

24

measure adjustments to the sale prices for rents of comparable

25

properties, to apply this technique,* sales or rental data on
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-41Q.

Why is this data collection process so important to an

MAI appraiser?
A.

You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but

their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base
their opinion.

We have a standards obligation,, an ethical

obligation to provide appraisal work in a non

—

Q.

Want to pull the microphone back towards

A.

—

—

in a non-misleading way, and to prove our —

our opinions.

prove

Not just to pull something out of the air, but

to actually prove our opinions.

Even though there's a lot of.

anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not
something these fast food operators particularly care about,
we need to go to the market to confirm that.
Q.

So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in

forming your opinions?
A.

Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my

sole reliance.
,Q.

Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case

studies?
A.

That I cannot is —

I cannot find in the marketplace

where this changed the subject's situation, specifically
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court,
that just this view impairment has no impact on market value.
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Q.

That's the c o n c l u s i o n of your d a t a ?

A.

Yes „

Q.

Is that s u p p o r t e d b y your other r e s e a r c h ?

A.

11 i i 3.

• Q.

Does it surprise you that you c o u l d n ' t find any value

for that v i e w out?
A.

It doesn't.

Q.

W h y is that?

A.

B e c a u s e of how common it is in this i m p e r f e c t world

that —

that view i m p a i r m e n t , especially in s i t u a t i o n s next to

the h i g h w a y , where y o u ' r e trying -to attract h i g h w a y b u s i n e s s ,
how c o m m o n that is, and why a business w o u l d l o c a t e in that
situation if it were —

if it were that c r i t i c a l o f a factor.

So I in i iot si 11 pi ised by the results.
Q.

Now, I've asked you to look at a b o o k by Misters

Bell and O r a l Anderson, published by the A m e r i c a n -- or the
Ap p i a i s a J 11 I s 1: :i t u t e, t i t ] e d "lx R e a 1 E s t a t e D a. in a g e s

1 1 a v e \ • :> u

looked at that book?
A.

Yes.

(,),

Y o i i' r e f am:i 1 :i a i w:i 11 I 1:1: I a t b o o k ?

A.

I am

Q-

In fact, I had the first edition, i m d you gave me the

second e d i t i o n ; is tha 1: i: :i g 1' i1:?
Yes.

A
:

Q

.

A newer mod - - newer version of it.

is this approach
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A.

I did.,

Q.

You obtained anecdotal evidence

A.

Yes.

Q.

—

—

from market participants; and based upon that

effort, that research, what was your conclusion?
A.

I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any value, loss

or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out
to the east, or this fast food restaurant property.
MR. HUNTER: Thank you.

Your Honor, might I approach

for a moment?
THE COURT: Please.
(Discussion at the bench off the record)
Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: So just to conclude, it is your

professional opinion that the view out from the Arby's
restaurant has no monetary value?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Thank you.

If you can stay, because we're going to

need to review some of these, if that's okay?
A.

I guess so.

Q.

I don't know how you got that set up.

thank you.

All right,

Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. WINDER:
Q.

Good morning, Mr. Cook.

A.

Good morning, Mr. Winder.
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-50A.

Yes, that's my testimony.

Q.

All right, and —

A.

Yes.

Q.

How wide is this?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

It's quite a distance.

and it's 20 to 22 feet high?

It's got how many lanes of

traffi c in each direction?
A.

I believe it has two lanes of traffic in each

direction.
Al 1 • r i ght,
where to where?

11 id 1: I : > w I o n g i s t :h i s obs t ru ct i on, f r oin

How long does it run?

A.

How long is the road, or how long is the --

Q..

Elevated.

A.

Probably three-quarters a mile to the north and a half

mile to the south.

Ilow long is the road as elevated here?

No, actually it probably continues elevated

even beyond a half mile to the south.
•jhav, now we —

we agree that view is a component of

value for at least some properties?
A.

Yes.

Q

A1 3 r :i g 1 I t , a i i d a i I e x a nip 1 e w o i I .3 d b e a r e s

a s :i i I g I e

family residence in a mountain resort?

ivhnt

A.-

Yes.

Q

11: c oi i ,3 d a 1 s o b e a. i I c f f i c e J:> i i :i 1 d :i n g w 1 I e r e s ome o i i € m a y
to look at the Wasatch and pay a little more rent, as

opposed to.looking at a building right next door; could be in
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that kind of situation?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right, it could be as individuals.

If we wanted

to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the —

or the bay

than something else?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

So a buyer, renter or tenant in these

situations may pay more for a view?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the

ultimate issue.

That is, does the impairment of view that's

been lost by the Arby' s operation, did they suffer any damage
because of it.

That's our difference.

A.

Yes, that's why we're here.

Q.

That's why we're here, okay.

some of these —

and I'm sorry, I —

Now, let's talk about

a copy of the slides that

I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than
yours.

In purple and at my age, there's —

I'm sorry, there's

no way I can read that, but' if —
A.

If you tell me what it is, then I'll

Q.

Thank you very much.

—

I appreciate that,

So let's —

let's review some of these slides, and talk about them.
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel.
teeny, tiny.

We had it there, yeah.

Good.

Irm on

My copies are

I can't read the
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DONALD J. WINDER #3519
JOHN W.HOLT .#5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS,
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),

APPELLANTS' MOTION
TO STAY BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Defendants/Appellants,
YD.

District Court No. 020700665

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511
PlaintifflAppellee.
Appellants (referred to herein collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, and
pursuant to Rule,23, UTAH R,

APP.

P.? hereby respectfully move the Court to stay the briefing

schedule in this matter pending the outcome of Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral
Beverage Corporation (Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC) (^Admiral Beverage").
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FACTUAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF SOUGHT
This is A rby's ti u rd apj >eal before the I Jtah Sup] em e Co i irt J" Vrby's f ;:•: the present
appeal following the jury trial conducted in the Second Judicial District Court in April, lo i (• A.s
; •

\\r

' .\ i

.i.i, ' i

>

'tiWHti

' *\'>>r :*>< . r a

"

iv

Pi

* 'Ilia* ' ^ •

\'H-

''•"•iu.g

before this Court. In Admiral Beverage, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of
whether this Court' 's i tiling in Ivei 's 1 "shoi ild be overruled on constiti itional groi iiicis " A tn le
and correct copy'of the June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and Rehearing is attached
hereto

The supplemental briefing is now ^ in;

mi.- •</.

•...-•• i

n--cra^

u-, .

Arby's filed a motion to file an amicus brief in the Admiral Beverage case. The motion was
granted and Arby's recently filed its brief.
The Court, on August 30, 2010, established a briefing schedule in this matter. Arby's is
currently required to file its opening brief on or before October 12, 21) 10. Because the ruling in
Admit .' R .*, / .7?i- could have a direct impact on this appeal, the briefing schedule in this matter
should be stayed"
ARGUMENT
Courts have the inherent and discretionary power to grant a stay of proceedings. See
I ewis i ' Mi mliree 627 P 2d 94 , , 96 (I Jtah 1981). Courts; commonly grant stays where there are
other actions pending that involve either identical parties and issues and where the decision of

1

The prior appeals herein were Ivers v. UDOT9 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) fivers F) and UDOT
v hers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) {"Ivers II").
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one settles the issues in the other, or "when the decision in an action is essential to the decision in
another." ii£
In the present matter, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Admiral Beverage will
have a direct impact on this appeal. In fact, the constitutionality of the Utah Supreme Court's
prior ruling, Ivers I is being considered in Admiral Beverage, Supplemental briefing has been
conducted on that issue and Arby's has filed its an amicus brief due to the direct impact the
Court's decision will have on its present appeal. If the constitutionality of Ivers I is being
evaluated, neither the parties nor the Court should expend time and resources in this matter until
the issues in Admiral Beverage are ruled upon and the impact upon this case is known.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Arby's respectfully requests this Court grant this Motion to
Stay the Briefing Schedule pending the outcome of Admiral Beverage,
DATED this \\ J

day of September, 2010.

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

laid J. Winder
Jbhk W. Holt
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of September, 2010, I caused a true and correct

copy of DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING SCHEDULE to be emailed and
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randy Hunter
Attorney Generals Office
160 East 3 00 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874
randyhunter@utah.gov

4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE SIATE DP UTAH

FILED
I !TAH APPELLATE COURTS

ooOOO

I l l 2 3 2010
Utah Department of Transportation;
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 20081054
Park City West & Associates;
valley Bank & Trust Company;
and Valley Mortgage Company,
Defendants and Petitioner.

ORDER FOB, SOT^LEMElTOMi BRIEFING
MSD KEHH&KIWG

The court hereby requests further briefing and orders
rehearing in this a&sa, which will be scheduled as soon as
possible after the vacancy currently existing on the court is
filled,
Specificallyr the court requests the parties to briei une
question of whether Ivers v, Utah Department of Transportation,
154 P,3d 802 (CJT 2007) should he overruled on constitutional
grounds.
The briefing shall comply with the court's general rules.
Petitioner's brief shall be filed by August 16, Respondent's
brief by September 16, and the Reply brief by October lf
i.
The parties' original.briefs will also be considered on
rehearing- ,The matter will thereafter be calendared for oral
argument„
FOR

Dated

W J? za/0

THE COURT;

Christine M* Durham
Chief Justice
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 23, 2010, a true and correct copy
of ehe foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered toj
REED L MARTINEAU
DAVID JASON HAWKINS
SHOW CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PL 11TH FL
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY XJT 84145-5000
BRENT A BURNETT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
150 E 300 S 5TH FL
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858
Dated this June 23, 2010.

Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20081054
District Court No. 970905361
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CERTTF'TilATF c>F SRi-'VTi'T,

I hereby certify that on October 4, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
DONALD J. WINDER
JOHN W HOLT
WINDER & HASLAM
175 W 200 S #4000
PO BOX 2 668
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2668
BRENT A BURNETT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 5TH FL
PO BOX 140858
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858
Dated this October 4, 2010.

Case No. 20100511
District Court No. 020700665
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT-*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
--00O00—

James Ivers, Katherin G. Havas,
and P and F Food Services,
Appellants,
Case No. 20100511-SC

v.
Utah Department of Transportation,
Appellees.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Appellantsr motion to
stay briefing pending the outcome of Case Number 2 008 1054, Utah
Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage. The motion is
granted.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee

1 Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC

vs.

•i

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE HAVAS AND P and F FOOD
SERVICES

AS AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION

DONALD J. WINDER#3519
JOHN W. HOLT #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 W. 200 S., Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Ivers,
Katherine Havas and P and F Food
Services
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Fifth Amendment

1
UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article 1, § 22

'.

:

:

1

STATUTES
UtahCodeAnn.§78B 6-511

1,4,7

ii
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
•

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation."
•

Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added).
•

UTAH

CODE ANN. §78B-6-511:

The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess:
*p

*r

1*

*J*

*»'

(2)
if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider,
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court.
20100511-SC.

Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No.

The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome

1
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried
under the law set down in Ivers I Arby's can provide additional insight and analysis
concerning why the Ivers I ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between
view and visibility in determining severance damages.

The Court's decision in the

present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending
appeal.
' STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to
recover severance damages.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT
Arby's is filing this Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a
property owner's right to recover just compensation.

Arby's does not dispute the

appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered.
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case was finally tried
in Second District Court on April 13-15, 2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view.
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional

2
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problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers L

The process was

challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of
condemnation law.
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionally protected right of just
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view.
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things
like high end resort properties with mountain views.
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's
construction project. Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers
I.
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, and
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and fully value property and
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a
property owner's right to recover severance damages.
ARGUMENT
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. Both of these
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the taking of
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even.broader protection than the United
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public
use without just compensation.
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages: .
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
determine and assess:
#

#

jjc 3JC *

#

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added).
4
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-6-511.

Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington,
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest comer of the former intersection at
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers /, the property's view and visibility
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant
property. Ivers I 154 P.3d at 804. Arby's journey through the appellate courts began
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established.
Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005).
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages.

5
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With respect to causation, this Court properly rejected UDOT's assertion that in
order to recover severance damages, the view-impairing structure must be built directly
upon the severed land. Ivers I, 154 P.2d at 807. This Court held:
When land is condemned as part of a single project - even if
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned
property is essential to the completion of the project as a
whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages.
Id
However, this Court went on to distinguish between view and visibility, and held
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. Therefore, Arby's was
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id.
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated
under the light of actual experience.
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that
were consistent with Ivers I. However, the task was made difficult because of differing
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that
conflict with aspects of Ivers I For example, other important condemnation cases that
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others.
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers L These principles became confused
in an attempt to follow Ivers I. Compensation for severance damages is the difference in
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See,
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this
Court stated in Rohan,
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value.
487 P.2d at 859.
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I holding that loss of view
is considered, but loss of visibility is not.
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon
Ivers I, it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific
property right that was damaged, i.e. view1, or whether view was a factor to consider
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B~6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the

1

Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court
mito/zOT.487P.2dat859.
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No.
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from
[Arby's] property/5 indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Jury Instruction No. 33,
contained the following caveat based upon hers I: "A property owner adjoining a public
highway has no right to be viewed by passing traffic and is not entitled to any
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic" (Emphasis
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's
damages.
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was
offered by Arby's in an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages.

Specifically,

severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d
at 929.

However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury

Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of
the loss of view from the defendants5 property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss

•8
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetaiy
value.
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the
fair market value as of December 305 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not
only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best
efforts to comply with Ivers I.
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial Cook's opinion was that
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial,
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "B").
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Cook's opinion
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally,
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Addendum "B'\ At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact
on the value .of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end
residential properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel
rooms with views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy of
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). In other words,
according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I the constitutional rights are
selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has property
damaged by a condemnor's actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision to
continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers 7, Arby's property right was
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the -jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there
was no damage.
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by
Phillip Cook that a property, owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property.
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself. Attempting to isolate the
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair
comparison of property value before and after the talcing.

See Utah State Road

Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had
their property not been taken"). The distinction between loss of view and visibility
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages.
Respectfully submitted this 0

day of September, 2010.
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

n

?}NALD J. WINDER
W.HOLT
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ADDENDUM
.A. Ivers Jury Instructions
B. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine
C. Excerpts of Phillip Cook Trial Testimony
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE. OF UTAH.'.'
. UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff, •

vs.

Case No. 020700665

JAMES IVERS; KATHERME G. HAVAS;
.and P AND F FOOD. SERVICES (Tenant),

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendants. •

Ladies and'Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial. You will receive additional
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed.

Dated this day:

4-/51Q

mDISTRICT COUKf PUDGE
MICHAEL Gt^XPHTN

ySS^
itl

, Op- !>&
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Before the trial of this case begins, I need to give you some instructions to help you.
understand what you will see and hear.
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff is the "
UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is. calledthe
defendant, hi this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G, HA.VAS, and P •
AND F FOOD SERVICES. .
The defendants seek damages for- diminutionof fair .market value for loss of view •.....
resulting frorn the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated
public highway.
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the
. condemnation of the defendants' property.
2.

GENERAL ADMONITIONS

You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin,, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves
during the trial.
Do not allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room,
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released
you from the jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so.
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your
attention, do not read or listen further. Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters
that are not evidence,
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the
instructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference
materials, Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate.
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not
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. decide on a verdict until after you have heard all of the evidence and have discussed it thoroughly
with your fellow jurors in your deliberations.
••''.• • Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your verdict

.:. . .

.At the end of the trial, Twill explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict..- •'.
'. - You must follow the law' as I explain it to you, even'if yo'irdo not agree with'the law.':,:- .••.-'. . !: •
3.

FURTHER ADMONITION ABOUT ELECTRONIC DEVICES

. :.

•. .<••-. • -Serious-problems have'been caused around the country by jurors using -computer, and . ••
. • electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigates:case, or to share..-•'.•
withothers our thoughts about the trial, and ifs easy to do so with the internet/and instant ; •
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. .
• .* .
However, please understand that the .rules of evidence and procedure have developed, over
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire .
system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on'evidence presented
.to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if you
conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others.
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" the
parties, issues, or counsel;. "Twittering" withfidends about the trial; using Blackberries or
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using.
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a: mistrial.
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried, •
at substantial cost. '
'
.
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror.
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no interest research
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. .
4.

ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the

trial
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law
that you must apply.
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It's your role to follow:.that law and .to decide.:what\fhe facts are. The facts generally relate
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much. The facts must be supported by evidence.
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case
based upon the evidence.presented in court, and the instructions that I give you.
•• . :
It's the lawyers' role to present evidence, generally by calling and questioning witnesses
and presentmg.exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to decide-the-case in favor of«.
his or her client,
•
.
Things that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way
real trials should be conducted. -Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy
and civility. : • • <
. - . . . • . •
5.

ORDER OF TRIAL
The trial will generally.proceeds follows:

.

(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the
case is about and what they think the evidence will show.
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing the
witnesses and seeing the exhibits.
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been fully
presented, I will instruct you on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions.
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law.
(4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will .
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you
should decide the case.
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence
presented in court and on my instmctions on the law. I will give you more instructions about that
step at a later time.
6.

SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT

From time to time throughout the trial, I will instruct you on the law. The order in which I
give the instmctions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety,
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither
should you.
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7.r,

JURORS MUST FOLLOW T H E INSTRUCTIONS

.•. •:: • .: The instructions that I give you are the'.law-, and your oath- requires you to. follow ,my: ••••". >•'
..instructions even if you disagr.ee with.them. •••.. :..
>.:>•••:•'..••.•• • •••..:••;...--.', ••-:.-.••
8.
JURORS MAY NOT DECIDE BASED ON SYMPATHY, PASSION, AND. ..
;. •-• • . . P R E J U D I C E - - - ^ , . , " : .-••••
•'••..•:-;;:-••-•/,
..You must not decide this case for or against anyone because you feel sorry for .anyone ;pr .
• angry at-anyone.. You must decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to ••.. -.;•.•
sympathy> passion'dr^prejudice: ••• . . •...-; .•*.•• .v:-. ••.,:••';.-••".. . :• . - ••,-••.;••:
9.

NOTE-TAKING

. , .

.

. y - .. •

If you wish, you may take notes during the trial and have those notes with you when you -.
. discuss the case.. We will provide you with writing materials if you need them. -If you. take notes, •
do not over do it, and .do not let your note-taking distract you from following the evidence, and . ,
you. should use them- only as a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the,
case.
•
10.

RULES APPLICABLE TO RECESSES

From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break,,
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. You
must obey the following instructions during the recesses:
Do not talk about this ease with .anyone - not family, friends or even each other. While
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so
that people will not try to discuss the case withyou.
•
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell
the clerk or the bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your
fellow jurors.
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness, B y this, I mean do not
talk with them at all, .even to pass the time of day.
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and you and your fellow jurors have discussed the
evidence. Keep an open mind until then.
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11.

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

• When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof-or that a party must prove something
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade you, by the evidence...
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true.
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable, doubt, but
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, .a
different level of proof applies; proof by a preponderance of evidence.
Another way of saying this is proof by the. greater weight of the evidence, however slight
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the-amount of .
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence, in weighing the
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party
presented it. The weight given to each piece of evidence is for you do decide- •
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not,
then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, if you decide that the
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact.
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that
must be proved.
12.

EVIDENCE

"Evidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified
opinions or any combination of these things.
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any
evidence that I order to be struck.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must
entirely disregard it Do not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make any
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the case, or
inspect any things or aiticles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you.
. ..
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about, this case in the media or
by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication.
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise,
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence.
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.
You are to consider only the evidence in the case; but you are not expected to abandon,;.,. •..- ;.your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the evidence in light of your-experience..
13.

DIRECT -AND CIRGUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 'evidence • •;•-. \consists offacts or circumstances that allow someone to.reasonably infer the truth of the. facts to. • •
be proved; For example,-if the fact to he-proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry-pie, and a •-...•••. •
•witness testifies-that-she saw lohnnytake a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the.. ••/••' *. fact. If.the witness testifesthatshe saw Jolirmy with Cherries smeared on his face and.an.empty •-..• pie plate inhis-hand,. that is .circumstantial evidence of the fact:
•••
...
14.

. BELIEVABILITY-OFWITNESSES-..• . -

-.v^.,'•'.•-;•'

Testimony in this case will be-given under oath. You must evaluate thebelievability of •••• ../',•
that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the testimony of a witness. Youmay .also . . • .
believe one witness- against many witnesses- or. many against one, in accordance with your honest
convictions. In evaluating the testimony of a witness, youmay want to consider the following:
(1) Personal interest Do you. believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected one way
.or the other by any personal interest the witness has in' the case?
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or
prejudice?
(3) Demeanor, Is there anything about the witness's appearance, conduct, ox actions that
causes you to give more or less weight to the testimony?
(4) Consistency. How does that testimony tend to support or not support other believable
evidence that is offered in the case?
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is
testifying about?
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable?
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human
experience?
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the •
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability.
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15.-

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS •

You may believe that a witness, on another .occasion, made a statement inconsistent with .
•that witness's.testimony given here. That doesn't mean thatyou are required-to disreganLthe:,•...-.
testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness.
• » ;
•.

•16.

EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY

:-.-.?:,. -

• If.you believe any witness has intentionally testified, falsely about any important -matter,.
you. may disregard the.entire-testimony of that witness, or you may disregard only, intentionally •
false testimony.
•
.';••.:.
17.

STIPULATIONS

• A stipulation-is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers .on both
sides stipulate or. agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that.fact
as proved. The parties have stipulated to the following facts:
a)

The legal description of the property subject to this litigation;

b)

That the photograph of the subj ect property introduced into evidence by the
defendants is an. accurate representation of the subject property; and

c)

That the date of valuation is December 30,2002.

Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of
this case.
18.

OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE

From time to time during the trial, I-may have to make rulings on objections or motions
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to object when the other side
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of the case or that I favor one side
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions
from the question itself.
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions
of law or procedure. Sometimes: you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go
slowly.
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-1:9. • • STATEMENT OF OPINION .
Under-limited -circumstances, 1 will allow.a witness.-to express.-an opinion, You--do .not..:
. liave.to. believe an opinion, whether orrnot it .comes .feom;m;expert witoess^Gonsider-opinion,. .
. • testimony as you wpuld any- other evidence, and-give it the weight you think it .deserves. • •...-.
•:20, . EXPERT. WITNESS, .

.--V:-

—-

. .-.•.: •

• •.•••. The-rules.of evidence-ordinarily do. not permit .the. opinions,of a.witness to.'be.recei^edas
. evidence. An' exception to this rule-exists:in .the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who;:hy,-.v,;-- •:
education, study and experience, havebecome expert-in some art, science, profession or. callingsmay state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as ..an expert, .-so/long •
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such ..expert opinion and: the ,-.•
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it
deserves. If you should decide* that the opinions of-an. expert, witness are not based upon- •
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons'given-in--support.;of the opinions are.not.sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other-evidence, you may .
disregard the opinion entirely.
21.'

CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS

In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of. J. Philip Cook and Jack Brown
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that .of another. In doing
this, you may consider the qualifications and credibility of each, as well as the reasons of each
opinion and the facts on which the opinions are based.,
[OPENINGSTATEMENTS.BY COUNSEL]]
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED]
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22.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE

The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages, which
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the particular laws or .rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number'twentytwo (22), .We-will now. read those instructions. .23.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM

You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss;.
this case:

24.

a.

All exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

Your notes (if any);

c.

Your copy of these instructions; and

d.

The verdict form or forms.

NOTES

The use of notes in the jury, room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let
.me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict
independently after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely
because that juror has taken notes.
25.

SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION

When you go into the jury room, your first task is to select a foreperson. The foreperson
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed. The
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors.
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important.
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up.
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that your mind cannot be
changed. Each of you must decide the; case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with
your fellow jurors.
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Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you. •• • .
should not surrender your honest, conviction's just to end the deliberations or to. agr.ee wifh.-.other • •
jurors. ..
•'
..-v. -.
, 26.

WHAT TO DO I F YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION

u ..-

:•• • -. -If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to -the
bailiff I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer )'our question whenever appropriate.However; these ihstinictions should- contain all the information you need to r.each-:a verdict based : y:\
upon the evidence. '
• • . . . .
27.

FOCUS.ON THIS-CASE-ALONE

:. f> r--, •;,.'. : / -,

Your duty is to decide this case and this, case alone. You should not use this case as a
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other eases, or BIS a means of expressingindividual or '•-.•••
• collective views- about anything other than the issues you are called upon- to decide.; .Your, verdict
should reflect the facts .as found by you applied to the law as explained in these.instructions and
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives;
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You willcontribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a • .
just and proper verdict.

28.

DO NOT SPECULATE OR RESORT TO CHANCE

When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's opinions at .
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence.
. If you decide that a party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, evaluate
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement on the amount.
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates.
29..

AGREEMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single question.
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have seen and heard during this trial.
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least
six jurors must agree on the answer to the question.
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will escort you
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you.
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30.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED

After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the cleric, may ask each of you about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you v/ill be excused from the jury box and you may leave
«at any time.: You'may remain in the cdnrtroomdf you-wish to watch the rest of the proceedings, .
which should be quite brief.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not
required to talk-about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you.about the case when you don't want to
do that, please tell the court clerk or bailiff.
" . . .
• 31.

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS'

This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private property of the defendant landowners for a ,
public purpose. The party commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah •.
Department of Transportation, and the property .owners-,,-known as the defendants, are James
Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include the value of
the loss of view from the defendants' property.
32.

OWNER TESTIFYING

Thedefendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants' testimony on the value of the
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal
involvement, the defendants7 specific Icnowledge of the property, and the defendants5 experience
and qualifications to testify regarding land, value,33.

TAKING

In. this case, the condemnation or "talcing" involves a parcel of land which was
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiff s project to expand and elevate U.S.
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane hi Farmington, Utah.
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a
reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent public highway and a view from their
property.
If you find that the fan market value of the remaining property is less in the "after
condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of view, then you may award damages
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain
and not contingent, remote or speculative.
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A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing'
traffic.
34.

LOSS OF VIEW

'

In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss .of view is to be measured by the sSert
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market^M^

35..

DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMA1NENT INJTJRY

The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in the fair market
value of the land immediately before and after the injury. This is called "diminution in value.'5
36. . FAIR MARKET VALUE

.

Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of money that land
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with a reasonable time allowed in which to
find a buyer with knowledge of .all the uses and purposes'to which the land was adapted...
• In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer would have paid a
willing seller in an aims-length transaction with both parties being fully rafoimed concerning all .'
of the advantages and disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any .
compulsion to buy or sell. .
ha this case you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the
defendants' property.
37.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in
value of the subject property.
38.

COMPARABLE SALES

Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in
determining fair market value of the property in dispute.
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39.

JUST COMPENSATION

The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property because of public
necessity. In tins case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of view from the
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value'of the loss of view from
the defendants'property.
40.

COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES

In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants5
property by detennining the fair market value as of December 30, 2002.
41.

INTEREST

You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such interest to the compensation
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law.
42.

LOSS OF PROFITS

In arriving at your detennination of fair market value of-the subject property, you shall
not consider alleged injury to any business or business operation conducted on or about the
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants'
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of
profits are not recoverable, but may be considered as bearing upon estabhshing the market value
of the subject property.
43.

HIGHEST AND BEST USE

The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for
which the property was reasonably adapted on the date of talcing, without limitation to the use
that was actually made of the property. The -highest and best use means its most advantageous
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably
foreseeable future. The tenn "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be
put to a particular use except for the taking.
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the
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:

-property at the time of the taking. The uses which may be considered must be .so. reasonably.
.:,.• -...:.;: probable as to have an. effect on the fair market value of the land at the time, of taking.- A purely •. .-•;. -• •,-, /
.imaginative-or. speculative'.use-.cannotbe: ; considered. •• ..,.-..• '..•
..-,:.• :.•-.,.-v /
:..-..: •-.;...;-...-.•.-,;.:••.

..In-detennining highest-and best use^you-maytake into consideration: (1) the actual, use. of••:•":• ••..>•:• .-••;.
the. property at the date fixed for evaluation; (2) its location; "(3) its topography;-. (4) the use of the' "••.-.
•.surrounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoningof the property at the time in. •. '.
-.question^ or the1 lack thereof; (6) the availability;of water and utility facihties.as-.ofthat time;-(7) •.-•
market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable property.-in, .;... ../.,-: "•
the general area; and (9).-. any other factors which you believe the-informed and willing .buyer aiidv./ ;vvv.;;.-..v
seller would take into account in fixing the probable use-.of the subject property, as of December •'•...:
3:0,2002, of- within- the reasonably foreseeable future. . • ••
...
.-v..
.. •• -.•*,.•:•., •„...•• ,,•-.... .'
44.

ACCESS

•

. You.areinstractedihat the use of .the highways andsfreetsmaybelirnited, controlledand.-..
regulated by the exercise of the police power .to the extent necessary to promote, the health, safety
and welfare of the public. However, the right to enter .and. leave a person's land-cannot be entirely
cut off..Free and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient •
access prior .to the enactment of the regulation.
;45.

'.SPECULATIVE COMPENSATION •

In determining just compensation, you are not to take into consideration imaginative or.
speculative values or damages. You are.not to consider, the price for which the property would-.
sell under special or extraordinary .circumstances, but only such values that axe real and supported
by the evidence.
46.

VIEWING OF PROPERTY

You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and applicability of the testimony and
evidence introduced in this trial.
Your view of the property is not evidence, in and of itself, upon which a verdict may be
based. You may use it- only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses.
47.

SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

The plaintiff has a legal right to condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants5 property.
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. 48.. SETTLEMENT OF VALUE OF PROPERTY •
.Theparties- have already reached agreement on the fair market value of the property taken
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been folly paid this value. .
• • The .purpose of this trial is to determine if the landowner is. to receive any additional.
compensation for the value, of the loss of view from their property. You are to. determine that.
dollar value, if any.-•
*.•-•...,>.
.
•49..-

ARGUMENTS .OF COUNSEL NOT EYIDENCE OF DAMAGES .

..;-:...,.-,, -

. You-.may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in deciding the .amounts, of
damages, but their arguments are not evidence.
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Donald J. Winder #3519 •
John W.Holt #5.720
WINDER. & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South #4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for D efendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
m AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
•TRANSPORTATION,

.

. "MEMORANDUM ESTSUPPORT OF .
' DEFENDANT'SMOTIONMLMTNEAND
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J.
PHILLIP. COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT •

•Plaintiff,:

vs.
Civil No. 020700665

JAWESrVERS;XATEDBRINBaHA.VAS, •
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant)
_ Defendants.

Judge Michael Allphin

|

Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby
respectfully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants7 Motion in Limine and Motion
to Strike Portions of J, Phillip Cook's Appraisal,
INTRODUCTION
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiffs ("UDOT") construction
project to elevate U*S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Faxmington, Utah. After a lengthy appeals
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Arby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to
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support the severance damages claim. UDOThas attempted through various motions to preclude
Arby's from recovering damages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages
resulting from loss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from
lay-witnesses not qualified as experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information he
obtained from, lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to
form their conclusions. Further, the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opinions have
not been disclosed to Arby's; Relevant portions of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market
"Participant Interviews/5 pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Cook..should.not be'
permitted to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay and lay opinions. He should
also be excluded from testifying based upon irrelevant data.
•.
" "

.ARGUMENT
POINT l '

•

COOIC RELIES UPON INADMISSASLE HEARSAY

Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of
the subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A."- This is problematic for numerous reasons. First,
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements
offered for the truth of the matter asserted Rule 801(c), UTAH R. BviD. Hearsay is generally

2
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inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EviD,, Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, UTAHR, EVE>. l
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his
opinion in part on out of court statements, Ci:[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked
in the form of an expert opinion, would have been impemiissible and potentially highly
prejudicial." .Edwards v. Didericlcsen>597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay evidence
is clearly not admissible at trial
••'"-''

•
;

: POINT2'

' " / . . '
•",..'

LAY WXTiqESSES.ARE,NOT QUALIFIED AS EXPERTS
• While some .of Cook's interviewees are named, many, of 'them are not identified and are
.only referenced vaguely and generally For example/ on page:5I, Cook .says -he spolce -with- 'the
managers .of several fast-food restaurants,...3' Exhibit "A". OIL page 52, he states: ccWe also
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he
allegedly spolce.
Moreover, insufficient infonnation is provided concerning the background and
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the

1

The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Cook relied upon other parties to
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into Hs Appraisal. It
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly
heardfromothers,
3
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subject real property. What are their job duties .and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of
view any part of their job duties? These individuals are apparently involved in managing
restaurants, but they, are not real estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an individual
named Treesa Kurtzenbora about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that
Arby's suffered no damage. No information is given concerning Ms. Kurtzenbom's expertise or
familiarity with the subject property, yet .she freely speculates and opines that other factors
impacted the value of the subject property more than the view, obstruction. There is no
foundation for such-a speculative opinionfrom.a.laywitness and.no explanation for why Cook
would incorporate such'a statement .from a lay witness into his own expert analysis. This Court
must insure that an expert witness is .'truly testifying as an expert and not merely serving as a
conduit through which-inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier,
468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2006) ("an expert witness .may not simply summarize the out-of-court
statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted). .
It is clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were .asked to render opinions based upon
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702, UTAHR, EVID. reserves such testimony
to experts who have the requisite 'laiowledge, skill., experience, training or education." Id.
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expert or otherwise.
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R. BVID., to the witness's own
perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of
Cook's interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses.

4
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Defendants .have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals
Cook interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants .should be given the opportunity to
.draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witaess
opinions, It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply pennit Cook to pass this untested -and
unchallenged information on to the jury.
POINT'S
THE LAY OPTIONS

OT^^

.

• There are. serious .problems with the relevance.of Cook's interview .data. As.an example,
Cook apparently interviewed an .assistant store manager of .the Smith's store and representatives
of a Burger King- on the east side .of U.S. 89, across -from the -subject Arby's location,' These
locations aremore .distantfromthe-elevated U.S.-89than the Arby's property. The Smith5 s;store
is further north than the Arby's property and. does not face the highest point of the elevated U.S.
89. Additionally, Cook fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view
at a grocery .store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on detennimng the loss in the
fair market value of the subject property. The Cook Appraisal is replete with this land of
irrelevant material.

2

Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view.
Eyen if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter,
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons
to whom customers would have complained.
5
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POINT 4
• THE MATERIAL COOK RELIES UPON IS NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER
REASONABLY BASES OPINIONS
.

Rule 703, UTAH R. EVID. states the data upon; which an-expert bases his opinion need not

be admissible ia evidence if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions....'5 Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses,
particulafly those who have no faxniharity with the subject-property, are the type of facts or data
upon which a licensed-real, estate appraiser would reasonably rely to. value property. The
material, which is not admissible due to the problems discussed above, is not of the type upon
which an appraiser relies to appraise'real property. Cook's opinions should be/based upon the
standard of Rule 702,

UTAH

R. EviD., rather., than memorialize impermissible lay opinions. '

Therefore, it should be rejected, and to. the extent Cook has relied upon that information, he
should be excluded from discussing it at trial.
•

.POINT 5

.

COOK'S UNDERLYING METHODOLOGY HAS NOT BEEN DISCLOSED .
Not only does Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the quahficationsof the
interviewees to render opinions, but he provides no information about the methodology of the
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject property with respect to
the view issue? What questions were asked? What is the identity of persons interviewed who
are not discussed in the Cook Appraisal? What individuals ;were mterviewed who are not

6
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mentioned in the report? What information was obtained through the interview process that
contradicts Cook's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews?
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were
interviewed. At amhimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAHR. BVID., if for some reason the Court
permits Cook to rely upon this data,-all of the facte and data underlying Cook's opinions should
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial.
• ,.;' .

'

.

'

. / : • ' • : ' • , .. POINTf •

•

..

With the concerns referenced above?, Cook's opinion does not meet the standards required
under Rule 702. That Rule, in relevant part, provides:'f

•".'".,

(b) Scientific, technical or olherwise specialized knowledge may
serve as the basis for .expert testimony if the scientific/technical? of
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data," and (iii) have been reliably applied to the
facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R BVE>, is
to be applied to "all .expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that, just, as in federal
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper* responsibility to screen out unreliable

7
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expert testimony." To Mfill this role, the -Note advises that the trial judge should "confront
proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible
evidence that may bear on reliability." ,
Because Cook relies upon irrelevant hearsay "opinions from lay witnesses, his opinions
are unreliable.

Defendants • submit the Court, acting as gatekeeper, should exclude .such

testimony and evidence at .'trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, portions of: J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal .should be stricken and he
should not be permitted to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay
oproion.

ft

DATED this /AO day'of March, 2010
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

paid J. Winder
Holm W. Holt

OTOxneys for Defendants
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March 3, 2010

n

Mr. Randy Hunter •
Assistant Attorney General
State .of Utah
•
160 East 300 South, 5*1 Floor '
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 •
Re:

•. -: . . . •

•... ,

Appraisal: A partial taking-of the view out property right appurtenant to land owned
by James ivers, et .aL (Arby's Restaurant), located' at ±1253 North Highway 89,
Farrnington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No, 269 of Project No. STP-0O67(1)O.

Dear Mr. Hunter:

•

As you know, on September 4, 2Q03,«we provided an appraisal addressing market value of."
the taking .of land and. site;.'improvements from the. above-referenced property. That
'appraisal, which addressed the value aftfta propentytaken, .severance da.iria.ges and'benefits,
was the basis for-negotiations that resulted in settling'the majority :of issues regarding the
property owner's claim for compensation/./Specifically, the parties have reached-settlement
on the value of the property .actually taken and claimed severance damages .relating "to the
taking of landscapingthat'ieft the property non-conforming relative to zoning.
The Court has 'heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the property. The Court ruled that
property owners have .no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have
appurtenantrightsonly to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the -owner's claim that
lost--view -out reduced value, of the property. Its conclusion was that view, from a. property
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto
must be addressed. •
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the
reduced view to the east clue to UDOT'S elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has
been paid.

201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84171
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364-6230 www.iecg.carn
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Page Two

As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of t h e data, reasoning,
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process t o develop an opinion of value. The
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the
intended use stated within this report.
.
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice (USPAP) as.promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation.
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of .Summons. 'After
careful consideration, and analysis of available information., -we are of the opinion that market
value of t h e subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view o u t Therefore, no
compensation 'beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for
lost landscaping is concluded, .
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report.
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be. of
• further.assistance. :•."•
'.
•[
",
.."•';.
Respectfully submitted, •

J4^*^C C 4 ^ ^ [J. Philip Cook, MAJ-CRE
LECG, LLC, Director
Utah State - -Certified General Appraiser .
Certificate 5451057-CGOO Expires 06-30-11

i Richard C. Sloan
1ECG, LLC,.Appraiser
Utah.State.- Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 57Q7759-CG00 Expires 11 -3.0-11

201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake Gfy, VT mill
main 801364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.lecg.com
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LECG

CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION.
We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property:

Property Owned by James ivers, et al.
{Arby's Restaurant)
Located at .±1253 North-Highway 89 •
Farmington, Davis County, Utah
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051 -0097
We certify thattothe best of our knowledge and belief:
1.

5,
6/
7.

9..
10.
IV
T2.
13.
14.
15.
16,

The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited-only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our
personal, impartial/and unbiased .professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions,
*We. have no presentor prospective interest in the. property that Is the subject of this report and we have no. persona! interest with
.respectto thepartieslnvolyed.
... "•• .• .
•
'
'.••••
t
We'have no present or prospective interest in the property that Is the subject of this report and nD personal interest with respect to.
the parties involved'
' We have no'bias with respect to-the property that is the subject of.this report ortothe parties involved .with this assignment
Our engagement in' this assignment was not contingent upon devebping;or reporting predetermined results.
Our compensation, for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of.a predetermined value' or
direction in value thatfavars the cause of the.client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of .a stipulated result, or the
occurrence of.aisubsequent event directly related to the Intended use of.this appraisal. .
The reported-analyses, opinions, and .conclusions -were -developed, and '.this report has been prepared -in conformity with the
••requirements of the "Code of-Professional .-Ethics.& Standards .of Professional .Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute; which
•include ihelf/rfform Standards- of Professional Appraisal Practice.
'.
'We:have made an Inspection of "the property that'is'the subject of.this.report
No one .provided professional.assistance in preparing this report'
j . Philip Cook has- completed the requirements of the continuing- education program of the Appraisal institute.-The value .conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific
valuation, or the.approval of a ban.
Our state appraisal certifications have not been -revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted.
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and -experience to complete the assignment in a
:
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers' Statement of Qualifications.
J. Philip Cook is currently a'Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451Q57-CG0Q.
Richard C Sloan is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #57D7759-CGQD

Dated: March 3, 2010

Iiu4wt^ (L ^ O T ^ ^
, Philip Cook, MAI CRE
ILECG, LLC, Director
HJtah State - Certified General Appraiser
(Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11

Richard C. Sloan
LECG, LLC, Appraiser

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5707759-CGOO Expires 11-30-11
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Market Participant Interviews

We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject
Similar to the subject; both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to the
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject.
.Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the. lack of view out of the storewas not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view.
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and .25 percent .or more
over the past two yeans.

'

•

•

.

'

.

'

:

' "

Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store said that he '
and his partner, Tom Long, purchased the store in 2004, after the construction of the. .
overpass. He said that the view of the. overpass from the restaurant-had no bearing on the
purchase • of the property .including the purchase price, -nor did the newly .constructed
overpass have any impact in general.

' ./

Adam Hawkes with NAf Utah in Layton, who is assisting in redevelopment of the
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares
what they are looking atonce they get inside the -building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB ,
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is .exposure.
Mason., is currently listing a-pad-site-for.saieJocated .near.the- SBO-North/M 5 interchange, in.. .
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with 1-75 raised up just to the east to
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price,
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway.

We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of
Carl's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Centervr/Je,
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street. All of these fast-food restaurants abut a •
PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS - ARBY'S KESTAURANT/03-207 OSL
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freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business.
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east The
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the
street She also said that customers could seethe mountains to the .east over the overpass.
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposure'
were the important'issues, Martin said that-once 'the customers were inside the store it
didn't ready matter what the view -was.

.

The layout .of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around'1993, is
similar-to the layout of the subject. 'Joe -Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury •Corporation, said he does.not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that
'Woodburywonld' not have-reduced the price -because of the obstructed view.
The .property owner of the Clearfield-Arby's,. Tneesa Kurtzeborn, .said that the raised-freeway
was hot a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both
.a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure "and proximity to an-off-ramp
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives-were but said that the raised freeway
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurfzeborn said that in purchasing the
.propentyL,she.loolced mote, atiwhat £b.e .surroundjngiievejqpinent was..aad.th.e;typ.e..of..draw. ,
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a
major draw to the center.
Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north,
purchased the subject in October 2009, According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once

PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS - ARBY'S RESTAURANT/03-201 OSL

.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 52

'LECG

SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

customers figured out how to use the interchange upon completion of construction, his
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically
• not view out Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's'restaurant with the intent of
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017.
We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site
' selection criteria and view out Russ Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that
view is a plus, but the view must be ready bad before it becomes a negative,, such as looking
at a. garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view .is
neutral Smith said that the primary concerns are access -and exposure, with demographics,
also playing a role, and he would have no .problem siting a.restaurant pear an overpass as it
.may mean better exposure. He noted that the view out from the Wendy's, restaurant in
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other .retail development to the west and east
Smith also .said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons
aresMingforahhourormore, .

•,.•'•.'..•'.'•..'.

Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager, with Carl's Jr., .said that view out is not
an issue as long as it is not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said ..
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price,
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to .site the restaurants by other retailers or
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she
can ..get people in. the door, jt .really ^dpesn^t matter whatthey.wew w

store., ijrthe.. _

case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most, Shaw
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it.
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road
hurt the business.

We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously

PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES {VERS - ARBY'S RESTAURANT/03-201 QSl
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass
of surrounding development, and'tries to negotiate reciprocal parking.
With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the
view* According to Langran, customers are not interested-in what they are looking-at out the
window. He said while .a view of the mountains may be-nice, it is not critical

In addition, Langran said that loss of exposure .affects the impulse buyer which* is roughly 20
percent of the business. ..He said that office-or residential customers that-are either return or.
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located
and'know the back way into the.property,. ;•

...

•• •

•For additional .support, photographs of various .properties' with .obstructed • views .in one or •
two directions, some of which were '.'previously discussed, are presented in .the addenda.
.The -majority of thds'e properties-were tbuilt-.with the view obstruction already in place,.and
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were .affected by the impaired view out

Conclusion
The' paired data analysis'is quite"conclusive' that' retail prope'rly,'values*are*not, impacted ""*'
negatively by the loss of view out This is also the overriding consensus among real estate
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's
value.

PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS-ARBY;S-RESTAURANT/G3-2010SL'
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•
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1

under the bridge?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay, let's look at slide.30, showing the distances.

4 1 You've indicated'that the distances, on the average, are a
. 5
6

little bit shy of 200 feet?
A.

Yeah, 192 is what we measure- from the store, itself,

7

to the wall.

8

wall.

9.
10
11
12

Q.

It's about ''65 feet from the prcper/ty line to the

• Okay".

Is it reasonable to review —- to refer to this

as a. "partial view impairment"?.
A- • .Certainly it/s o n l y a partial view impairment..
•There's no ~

• • ..

.

13

Q.

There's.not a total, view impairment?

14

A.

— t h e r e ' s no"material view impairment in most

.15'.' directions, b-ut to the east there is a partial view impairment.
16

Q.

17

A. . It.can be.

18

Q.

What type of real estate is view important to?

19

A.

Resort hotels overlooking the ocean, a view would be

Is view an important.amenity for real estate? •

20

very important.

21

an amenity for which buyers will pay a premium.

High end homes in resort settings, a view is

22

Q.

How about industrial properties?

23

A.

Industrial properties are not bought for view out.

24

Most industrial buildings don't have windows.

25

they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial

They're --
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buildings are typically designed for either storage where

2

they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well

3

as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't

4

have windows; or it's manufacturing, where they don't want

5

employees to be looking out the window while they' re -- while

6

they're working, for safety purposes.

7
8

Q.

How about the view in, visibility/ is that important

to an industrial property?

9

A.

It can be.

10

Q.

Why is that?

11

-A.

Well, some industrial businesses are ~- they'll have

12

a what we call -a ushowroom warehouse."

13

construction materials companies like tile companies will

14

like to advertise and get people into their showroom.

15

are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the

16

homeowner's picking out the goods.

17

to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that

18

can help their business.

19
20

Q.

Yes.

22

Q.

Does that contribute —

25

their name or

some advertising on the outside of the building?
A.

24

They

So if they can be exposed

Is it customary for them to put some —

21

23

So like a lot of home

that visibility contribute to

an industrial property?
A.

An industrial user that is worried about -- or is

hopeful to get some recognition from-the marketplace, that's
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-20exactly what they want to do.
Q.

It provides some name recognition?

A..

Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that

don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial
users where there's some advantage to that disability.
'•'Q.

So the visibility in is different than the visibility

out./ is that what you're saying?

• .•

'A.

Significantly.

.

Q.

Okay, how about fast" food restaurants.;' is. view out an

important amenity to a fast food restaurant?
A.. ' It is not. ' It wasn't listed in the .criteria of site
selection -for fast food operators.

It. wasn't, something'that in

my varied discussions with individuals who are. involved in that
business identified as' an issue." -I've also studied it with
specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity that fast
food restaurants care about.

•

Q.

Where are fast food restaurants typically.located?

A.

They are typically located along freeway interchanges

or in front of shopping centers.

Ideally, both.

Q.

Is that for their convenience?

A.

Right, it's for convenience, it's.for visibility, it's

for accessibility.
Q.

I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently

located at highway/freeway intersections.
A.

They are.
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2
3

Q.

Why is this data collection process so important to an

MAI appraiser?
A.

You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but

4

their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base

5

their opinion.

6

obligation to provide appraisal work in a non ~-

We have a standards obligation, an ethical

7

Q.

Want to pull the microphone back towards --

8

A.

—

9

in a non-misleading way, and to prove our -- prove

our opinions.

Not just to pull something out of the air, but

10

to actually prove our opinions.

11

anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not

12

something these fast food operators particularly care about,

13

we need to go to the market to confirm that.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

Even though there's a lot of

So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in

forming your opinions?
A.

Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my

sole reliance.
Q.

Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case

studies?
A.

That I cannot is —

I cannot find in the marketplace

21

where this changed the subject's situation, specifically

22

related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding

23

accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which

24

I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court,

25

that just this view impairment has no impact on market value.
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That's the conclusion of your data?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that supported by your other research*?

A.

It is.

Q.

Does it surprise you .that yo,u couldn't .'find any value

for that view out?
A.

It doesn't.'

. Q.

Why is that?

*
•'••'.'•

A. - Because of how common it is in this imperfect worl:d
'that --'that view impairment, especially .in situations next to'
the highway, where you're trying to. attract'highway business,
how. common that is., and'why. a business would locate 1 in that-'
situation i.f i't were —'• if .it were .that critical of a .factor. ..
So. r'm. not" surprised by the results.
•Q.

•

••,. "

••••".'

Now, I've aske.d you to look, at a book- by Misters

Bell and. Oral Anderson, published by the American —
Appraisal Institute,'titled

AV

Real.Estate Damages."

looked at that book?

.

or.the
Have you
•'

A.

Yes.

Q.

You're familiar with that book?

A.

I am

Q.

In fact, I had the first edition, and you gave me the

second edition; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

A newer mod -- newer version *of it.

Is this approach
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I did.

Q.

You obtained anecdotal evidence --

A.

Yes.

Q.

—

from market participants; and based upon that

effort, that research, what was your conclusion?
A.

I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any value, loss

or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out
to the east, or this fast food restaurant property.
MR. HUNTER: Thank you.

Your Honor, might I approach

for a moment?
THE COURT: Please.
(Discussion at the bench off the record)
Q.

BY MR, HUNTER: So just to conclude, .it is your

professional opinion that the view out from the Arby's
restaurant has no monetary value?
A,

Correct.

Q,

Thank you.

If you can stay, because we're going to

need to review some of these, if that's okay?
A.

I guess so.

Q.

I don't know how you got that set up.

thank you.

All right,

Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. WINDER:
Q.

Good morning, Mr. Cook.

A.

Good morning, Mr.' Winder.
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A.

Yes, that's my testimony.

2

Q.

All right, and -- and it's 20 to 22 feet high?

3

A.

Yes.

4

• ;Q.

.5

A.

I don't know.

.6

Q.

I t ' s q u i t e a d i s t a n c e . ' I t ' s got how many • l a n e s of

7

traffic

•

8

:• A. .

H O W wide is this?

in each direction.? .
I b e l i e v e i t has two l a n e s of t r a f f i c in

direction.

10
11

Q..

.

each

'

All r i g h t ,

...••.•
and how long is, t h i s o b s t r u c t i o n ,

from

where t o where? . How l o n g does i t run?--

:

•12

A.

'How long i s t h e road, or how.lon.g i s . the —

13

Q.

Elevated.

14

.A.

Probably t h r e e - q u a r t e r s a - m i l e to t h e n o r t h and a h a l f

15'' m i l e t o t h e s o u t h .
16
17

How long i s the road as e l e v a t e d h e r e ?

Mo, a c t u a l l y i t p r o b a b l y c o n t i n u e s

elevated

even beyond a h a l f mile t o t h e s o u t h .
Q.

Oka-y, now we - - we agree t h a t view i s a component of

18. v a l u e f o r a t l e a s t some p r o p e r t i e s ?
19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

All right, and an example would be a res —

21

•
a single

family residence in a mountain resort?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

It could also be an office building where someone may

24

want to look at the Wasatch and pay a little more rent., as

25' opposed to looking at a building right next door; could be in
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that kind of situation?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

All right, it could be as individuals.

If we wanted

4

to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay

5

more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the —

6

than something else?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

All right.

9

or the bay

So a buyer, renter or tenant in these

situations may pay more for a view?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the
That is, does the impairment of view that r s

12

ultimate issue.

13

been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage

14

because of it.

That's our difference.

15

A.

Yes, that's why we're here.

16

Q,

That's why we're here, okay.

Now, let's talk about

17

some of these —

18

I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than

19

yours.

20

no way I can read that, but if

and I'm sorry, I —

a copy of the slides that

In purple and at my age, there's -- I'm sorry, there's
—

21

A.

If you tell me what it is, then I'll

22

Q.

Thank you very much.

—

I appreciate that.

So let's --

23

let's review some of these slides, and talk about them.

24

page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel.

25

teeny, tiny.

We had it there, yeah.

Good.

I'm on

My copies are

I can't read the
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UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAMES IVERS; KATHERTNE G. HAVAS,
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),
Defendants/Appellants,

APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND FOR REMAND TO
DISTRICT COURT

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

District Court No. 020700665
Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511

Plaintiff/Appellee.

Appellants James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein
collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel and pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 10(a)(2)(A),
hereby respectfully move for summary disposition and ask the Court to reverse the Judgment on
Verdict in the trial court. The basis for this Motion is that the Court has reversed Ivers v. Utah
Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers I"), which was Arby's original
appeal in this matter. Ivers I was reversed in Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral
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Beverage Corp., 2011 WL 5110962 (Utah). UDOT petitioned for a rehearing in Admiral
Beverage, however, that petition was denied on February 22, 2012.
This present Arby's appeal was stayed by the Court pending this Court's ruling in
Admiral Beverage. Because Ivers I has been reversed, the Court should proceed to reverse the
trial court's judgment in this matter, which was based upon the wrongly decided Ivers I opinion,
and remand the matter to the lower court for further proceedings under the principles of Admiral
Beverage,
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum submitted together herewith.
DATED this ^ V d a y of March, 2012.

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

Donald J. Winder
Jdhn W.Holt
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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Randy Hunter
Attorney Generals Office
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
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DONALD J. WINDER (#3519)
JOHN W.HOLT (#5720)

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
460 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Facsimile: (801) 322-2282
dwinder@winderfirm.com
iholt@winderfirm.com
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS,
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),
Defendants/Appellants,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND FOR REMAND TO
DISTRICT COURT

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

District Court No. 020700665
Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511

Plaintiff/Appellee.

Appellants James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein
collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby respectfully submit this Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition and for Remand to District Court.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This case was tried in the district court during April 2010, after it was remanded for a
second time by this Court following its ruling in UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009)
("Ivers IF).

The case was tried based upon the ruling in Ivers v. Utah Department of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) fivers F\ which precluded Arby's from presenting
evidence concerning the reduction in fair market value. The confusion and inconsistency created
by Ivers I was manifest by the fact the jury awarded absolutely no severance damages to Arby's
despite its clear entitlement to an award of at least some amount of severance damages.
While the present appeal was pending, the Court requested supplemental briefing in the
case of Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp, Case No. 20081054, a
case which sought to reverse Ivers I because of the very problems that resulted in a no cause
verdict at the trial of this matter. This Court ordered to stay the present appeal pending the
outcome of Admiral Beverage because of its impact on this ongoing matter. Arby's filed an
amicus brief in Admiral Beverage.
On October 18, 2011,, this Court issued its opinion in Admiral Beverage (2011 WL
5110962 (Utah)), reversing Ivers I Thereafter, UDOT petitioned for a rehearing, but the Court
denied that petition on February 22, 2012.
Arby's submits that based upon the reversal of Ivers I in Admiral Beverage, this case
should now be remanded to the district court.
ARGUMENT
Since the Court's October 4, 2012 Order, this appeal has been stayed pending the
outcome of Admiral Beverage. The purpose of the stay was because the decision in Admiral
Beverage would have a direct impact on this appeal if Ivers I, the first appeal in this very matter,
were reversed. Arby's appeals the Judgment and Verdict entered in the district court because
application of the statement of law in Ivers I resulted in confusing jury instructions about how
severance damages were to be determined by the jury.

Ultimately, Arby's was awarded
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absolutely no damages despite the fact it was entitled to at least some measure of severance
damages. See Docketing Statement filed herein, at pp. 2-6.
In Admiral Beverage, this Court admitted blatantly that "Ivers was wrongly decided."
Admiral Beverage 2011 WL 5110962*5,1(20, *9, % 35, a,nd *11,f35. The Court determined that
when evaluating damages, there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise separate items
of damage. Id. at *8, ^31. Instead, damage should be "viewed in the composite." Id. This
attempt to distinguish between loss of view and loss of visibility is what resulted in the
inconsistent and confusing jury instructions at trial in the lower court. Because of Ivers i, the
jury wasn't able to merely evaluate the loss of fair market value resulting from the taking, but
had to attempt to value loss of view from the property in a vacuum. See Brief of Arby's as
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Admiral Beverage Corporation at pp. 4-11, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
CONCLUSION
Because Ivers I has been reversed in Admiral Beverage, and this case was stayed because
of the potential Admiral Beverage would reverse Ivers I, the case should now be remanded to
district court for further proceedings
DATED this

u K day of March, 2012.

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

Dbffald J. Winder
VJo&n W.Holt
attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
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Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC

vs.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AKD CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
•

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation."
•

Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added).
•

UTAH CODEANN. §78B-6-511:
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess:
* * # *

*

(2) if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF .AMICUS CURIAE
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider,
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court.
20100511-SC.

Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No.

The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome

1
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried
under the law set down in Ivers I, Arby's can provide additional insight .and analysis
concerning why the Ivers /ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between
view and visibility in determining severance damages. The Court's decision in the
present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending
appeal.

.
' STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for ..Supplemental Briefing and
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to
recover severance damages.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT
Arby's is filing this -Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits, a
property owner's right to recover just compensation. Arby's does not dispute the
appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered.
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case was finally tried
in Second District Court on April 13-15,2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view.
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional

2
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problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers L

The process was

challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of
condemnation law.
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionaliy protected right of just
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view.
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things
like high end resort properties with mountain views.
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's
construction project Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers
L
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The

3
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, aad
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and folly value property and
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a
property owner's right to recover severance damages.
ARGUMENT
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.' Both of these
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the talcing of
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even.broader protection than the United
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public
use without just-compensation.
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages: .
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
determine and assess:
$ £ $ # £ #

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added).
A
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-6-51l.

Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington,
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest corner of the former intersection at
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers I, the property's view and visibility
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant
property. Ivers I 154 P3d at 804. Arby's journey -through the appellate courts began
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established.
Ivers y. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005).
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages.
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"With respect to causation this Court properly rejected UDOT's assertion that in
order to recover severance damages, 'the view-impairing structure must be built directly
upon the severed land. Ivers I9154 P.2d at 807. This Court held:
When land is condemned as part of a single project — even if
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned
property is essential to the completion of the project as a
. whole^ the property owner is entitled to severance damages.
Id

•

•

•

"

However, this Court went on-to distinguish between view and visibility, and held
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. .Therefore, Arby's was
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id.
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated
under the light of actual experience.
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that
were consistent with Ivers L However, the task was made difficult because of differing
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that
conflict with aspects of Ivers I. For example, other important condemnation cases that
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P*2d 926
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept ofTransp v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others.
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers I These principles became confused
in an attempt to follow Ivers L Compensation for severance damages is the difference in
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See,
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 247
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952), This determination of fair market value can only be made by
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this
Court stated in Rohan,
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value.
487 P.2d at 859.
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers /holding that loss of view
is considered, but loss of visibility is not.
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon
Ivers I, it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific
property right that was damaged, ie. view , or whether view was a factor to consider
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B~6-511 for calculating severance damages, ie., the

Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court
in Rohan. 487 P.2d at 859.
7
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No.
31 ioformed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from
[Arby's] property," indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Jury Instruction No. 33,
contained the following caveat based upon hers I: "A property owner adjoining a public
highway has .no right to. be- viewed by passing traf&c and is not entitled to -any
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic?" (Emphasis
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's
• damages.

.-.•'.

With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided ".The loss of view is
to'be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was •
offered by Arby'sin an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages.

Specifically,

severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d
at 929. However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury
Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of
the loss of view from the defendants' property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes Hie fair market value of the loss

•8
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetary
value.
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' properly by determining the
fair market value as of December 30, 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not
only were the Juiy Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best
efforts to comply with hers L
• The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial,
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum CCB").
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project Cook's opinion
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally,

9
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Addendum "B'\ At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact
on the -value .of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end
residential properties, office.spaces with views of title Wasatch Mountains, and hotel
rooms with views of the San .Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy, of
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum CCC")- In other words,
according to UDOT. and its '.appraiser, under Ivers I, the constitutional- rights, are
' selectively applied. Just compensation is. not afforded to everyone who has property
damaged by a condemneds actions. UDOT was .able to use the Ivers I decision to
•continue, to deny just compensation to Arby's.. Under Ivers I, Arby's property .right was
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there
was no damage.
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by
Phillip Cook that a property,owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property.

10
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself. Attempting to isolate the
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair
comparison of property value before and after the talcing.

See Utah State Road

Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had
their property not been taken")- The distinction between loss of view and visibihty
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages.
Respectfully submitted this \J

day of September, 2010.
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

SNALD J. WINDER
M N W.HOLT
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ADDENDUM
.A. Ivers J^y Instructions
B. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine
C. Excerpts of PMllip Cook Trial Testimony

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SECOND1 DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY'
,'.'..''. '""'."' "; '.' "STATE OF UtAH.': '.'"'."•
.UTAH.DEPARTMENT OF
.TRANSPORTATION, '
. -. • Plaintiff,..

,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
•

.,..'.

vs.

Case No. 020700665

JAMES IVERS; KATHEPJNE G..HAVAS.;.
.and P AND F POOD. SERVICES (Tenant),

Judge Michael G.. Allphin.

Defendants. ••

Ladies and'Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial. You will receive additional
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed.

Dated this day:

^/S-jD

DISTRICT CO'
MICHAEL G,

JUDGE
LPHTN

Nfc\
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1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Before the trial of this case begins, Ineed to give you some instructions to help you. .
understand what you-will see and hear.
.....
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff, hi this case the plaintiff is the • ••"
UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is called-the •
defendant, hi this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G, HAVAS^and P • •
AND F FOOD SERVICES. . •••
. . - . ; . .
The defendants seek damages for diminution*of fair .market value for loss of view •.......
resulting from the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated •
public highway.
•
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the
. condemnation of the defendants'property.
2.

GENERAL ADMONITIONS '

You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves
during the trial
Do sot allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room,
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released •
youfromthe jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so.
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your
attention, do not read or listen further, Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters
that are not evidence,
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the
mstructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference
materials, Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate.
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not
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.. decide on a verdict until after yon have heard all of fhe evidence and have discussed it thoroughly •
•with your fellow jurors in your deliberations.
. •.:*.•
.-. ••
•• -Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or pubhc opinion influence yorn verdict

•:•...•-y..

.At the end of the trial, Twill explain the law that yon must follow to reach your -verdict: •". •. ' , • •
'/You mxist" followthe law' as T explain it to you;'eveh if you:'do hot agree wi
..-,-•. . !;•• ••.-"..•'•.••'.
v.3,--

F U R T H E R A D M O N I T I O N A B O U T E L E C T R O N I C DEVICES..

•'•,•,;•,•'

-:-•;••.'.••.

• •• .-• •". • :;Seii'0US.pfoblefns have'b'e6n caused around the country by jurors usixig computer, and •/• <• -,%-. • • , • •: ". •*•'.
. • electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigates: case, or to shark.--v •• v.
. with.- others our thoughts about the trial, and if s easy, to do' :so with the intemet/and instant •: •.'•
••• "••
communication devices or sendees, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. • .
• However, please understand that the.rules -of evidence and procedure have developed, over •''•-••
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the-entire . • .
• system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your- decisions based on" evidence presented •.. •
. to you m court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if yon
•conduct your own investigations or.communicate about this trial with others.
• Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" fhe
parties, issues, or counsel;,"Twittering" with friends about the trial; using Blackberries or
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial'updates on Facebook pages; using.
WiMpedia or other .internet information sources, and so OIL Even nsing something as seemingly
' innocent as "-Google Maps" can result in a mistrial.
'
•.
Post-trial investigations are commonand can disclose these improper activities. If they
are discovered, they will.be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to-be retried, •
at substantial cost. '
•
.
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror.
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completelyfinished.Do no interest research
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. .
4.

ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the

trial
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law
that you must apply.
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• -It's your role to foHomthatlaw and .to decide;what 'the facts-are, The facts generally relate
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much, The facts must be supported by-evidence. •
Neither the lawyers norl actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case
based upon the evidence.presented in court, andthe instructions that I give you.
.......
It's the lawyers' role to .present evidence,-.generally by calling and questioning witnessesand presenting, exhibxte, Eachlawyer will also try to persuade you to decide*-the-case in favor -of«
his or her client
•
Tilings that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way
real trials should be- conducted, -Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy
and'civility. : • -.• • . • " . . . . • • • •....•: . ; . . - . . • • • _
.
- •.
5,

ORDER OF TRIAL
The trial will generally, proceed-as follows:-.

•:..

•••••.

(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the
case is about and what they think the evidence will show.
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing .the
witnesses and seeing the exhibits.
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been folly
presented, I will instruct you. on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions.
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law.
. (4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will .
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you
should decide the case.
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence
presented in court and-on my instructions on the law. I will.give you more instructions about that
step at a later time.
6.

SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT

From time to time throughout the trial, I will instinct you on the law. The order in which I
give the instructions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety,
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither
should you.
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..7.r:. - JURORS MUS^POLLOW.^THE INSTRTJGTIONS

. -••.,.

.•..*;• . f Theinstaotions\£to
•.. instructions even if you disagree with. them. ••••,. . • .*.

:

8...- •.. JBROia-MAy-NOTDECIDGE-BASED-O
:•.•-• -PREJUDICE-. '•-••,,,•: .-•.•• •;:-. ' ' • • • . • . • • • ,

. •.;. ..... : r ^;.:•-.-/.v..: •

,.• \ •
' ? .:•,,••• ;->.^ •• .•,...-..,-..;. • ••:.•.- •

•

. . . ' . " , .

• ;•'-:

,••.-• , . ^ \ . ,-:\
'.
•.-:•:.;;
>.^.;V
:,..'
A
:

, You must not decide this .case for or against anyone because you feel sorry iox .anyone pr •.. ;•.;••*.
•• angry at -anyone.. You must decide this .case based on the facts ^and fhe law, ^ifihout regard ±q ••.. •.:•.• • .'. •... ::
.' sympathy, "passion Dr.rprejudice: •-; . . *..,'•; •'• ..••.•• .v ;•..-., :•- '
. . :-r''':.
.*.. . -, -.-.:••'. -v-i- •
9. ••. .NOTE-TAKING .-•,•;

. •.,..

\ v-';v -.- .-/.-• r - • •

" If you wish, you may take notes 'during the trial and have those notes with you when you .
•. discuss the case.. We will-provide 'you with writing materials if you need them; 'If you. take notes\>; \ . N
do not over do it, and .do not let your note-taking distract you from f ollowirig the evidence,, and
you.should use them only as. a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the, • .. • ,.
case.
• "'•
• • . . ' "
'.•'.-.
..•...••••

.10.' • RULES APPLICABLE TO RECESSES'
•From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few •minutes, a lunch break,;
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess.' You
must obey the following instructions during the recesses:
. ' • •.
• Do not talk about this case with .anyone - not family, Mends or even each other. While •
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so
•that people will not try to discuss the case with' you.
• •
• .
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell
the cleric orthe bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your
fellow jurors.
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness. B y this, I mean do not
talk with them at all, .even to pass the time of day.
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and yon' and your fellow jurors have discussed the
evidence. Keep an open mind until then.
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PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

11.

• • When I tell* you that a party has the burden of proof .-or that a party must prove^something.
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade yon, by .the evidence...
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true.
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be'beyond a reasonable, doubt, but
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, .a
different level'Ofproofappli-es;proofbyapreponderance of evidence.
.•
Another way of saying-this is proof by the.greater weight of the evidence, however slight ••
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the-amount of .
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In weighing the
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party
presented it. The weight given to e&ch piece of evidence is for you' do decide. •
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not,
then you must find that the fact has been proved, On the other hand, if you decide that the
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact.
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that
must be proved.
12,

EVIDENCE
cc

Bvidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified
opinions or any combination of these things.
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any
evidence that I order to be struck.
.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must
entirely disregard it. Do not make any investigation about Hie facts in this case. Do not make any
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the.case, or
inspect any tilings or articles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you.
. ..
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about, this case hi the media or
byword of mouth or other out-of-court communication.
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise,
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence.
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•••• . •• You are to consider only the evidence in -the case: but yon are not expected to abandon, :.f/./,
your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the -evidence in light of yonr-experience.. •. •"
13;

DIRE-CTANDC^

• •

•• • ;
• ..

. \ , *••:.'• ..^V-:' r<: s • *

A fact may be proved'by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 'evidence ••••;••.>••':
• consists offacts or'circumstances' thafallow someone to .reasonably-infer the truth ofthe.facts to. • * •;•• •.•• '/.:•••' f\
be proved; For example, -if the fact to he-proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry-pie^, and a - •..••.. •
' • witness- testifies'that ''she saw- Jobnny'.talce a bite of the cherrypie, that is direct.evidence-of the-, -v'-v ••• : •.'•:*.:.;
fact, Ifthe witness testifiesfhat-she saw Jokmy wittL Cherries smeared on Ms face and.an,empty:„- ;-.•'.. • !-..
. pie plate in Ms hand,- that is .circumstantial evidence of the fact •'
. . . ; • . . • • ; • ',:.••*,•...'.•; - .- ... -./.. :•:.,.
14.

. BELIEVABELr^

. . * • •• •:"-:

'• •

••.... ;.. \v^.;'.;y.- : =:-"; : :.

.Testhnonym this case will be:givenunde3; oath. Yaumust evaluate the-behevability-of ;.:•••• •Jr "• .*• • ••
that testimony. You may beli-eve all or any part of the testimony of a witness. You ma]/.also . •.: • . ••••." ;
believe one witness-against many witnesses- or many against one,.in accordance with your honest
• -... .•
•convictions. In evaluating the testimony of .a witness, you may want to consider .the foHowing: ...... : / : .
(1) Personal interest. Do you.believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected-one way
.or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the case?
;(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or
prejudice?
'
• . • • . ' • •
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about .the witness's appearance, conduct, ox actions that •
causes-you to give more or less weight to the testimony?
' (4) Consistency. How does .that testimony tend to -support or not support other believable
evidence that is offered in the case?
.
•
(5) Knowledge, Did Hie witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is
testifying about?
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable?
(7) Reasonableness.'Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human
experience?
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the •
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability.
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15. • INCONSISTENT 'STATEMENTS •
You may believe that a -witness, on another .occasion, made a' statement inconsistent with •.
.•that witnesses ^testimony given.here; That doesn't mean thatyou are required:to disregar&the:,.-..:'testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness.
• > •/ • . •
• 16..- -EFFECTOF WILLKULLYFAIiSE TESTIMONY

;-->V " '-

• •• If.jyou believe- any-witness has intention-ally.testified, falsely about any important-matter, .• .
youmay disregard ;j(he.enth'e-testimony of .that witness, or you may-disregard only.intentionally •
false testimony.- ' -\ - . • • • . *
. •
./: • . •"- • •.:;
17.

STIPULATIONS

:• .•••:,

-j

• A stipulation--is an "agreement Unless Iinstruct you otherwise, when the lawyers .on both
sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the. stipulation as evidence .and regard .that.fact
as proved. The'parties have stipulated to the following facts:
.. • .
a) '

The legal description of the property subject to this litigation;

b)

That the photograph of the subj ect property introduced into evidence by the
defendants is an accurate representation of the subject property; and

c)

That the date of valuation is December 30,2002.

Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of
this case.
18.

OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE

From time to time during the trial, I may have to make rulings on objections or motions
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to obj ect when .the other side
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of fee case or that I favor one side
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions
from the question itself.
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions
of law or procedure. Sometimes you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go
slowly.
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• 1-5, • • STATEMENT OF OPINION .
. . Under-limited'circumstances., Twiilall^w-.awi
. have .to. believe an opinion, wheth^ormoHiLcomes.ft^^
.-.. .. ...
. -testimony-as you wpuld any-other evidence, and.-give it the weight.you thipkjtdessrv.es. • . •,.-.-..,
. • : % , EmBT-TONESS.,'.-

'.'•"/•

•.;./'

;:->:1::I:-,:''v;.

. . • .. The•.Blle's,of3yidenc,e^Qrdinarilry• do.-np£peimi*:fhe. opinions^of a."witness tor-lge.reQeived-a.S:. • • ,
. evidence. An exception to this rule-exists:in the. case-pf: expert-witnesses. .Witnesses who;':.hy«.-- •••-. • _•.
.education,' study and-experience, havebeeome expert -in some art, science, profession or.calliag,: • \;.
' may state opinions-as to- any such matter in which -that witness.is qualified as ..an exp.ert,:SQ;long. • ......
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such ..expert opinion and;fhe •:.-.? .-.
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Givo it the-weight you thihk it
• deservesi-If you should decide-that the .opinions of-an. expert.-witness are not-based upon- • • ';• - . • -1: •
• sufficient-education .and experience, or if you should conclude -that'the reasons given -ki< support./ ••;...of.the opinions -are.not.'sound, or that such opinions are outwei^ed by other-evidence^ youmay .
disregard the opinion entirely.
\
. ' • " • • ' ' • . . - . • .
21; ' CONELICHNG TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS . . \ . /

•

;•'

In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of. "J. Philip Cook-and Jack Brown .
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that .of another. • la -doingthis, you may consider -the qualifications and credibility, of each,'as well as thexeasohs. of each
opinion and" the facts on which the opinions SIQ based'.- •
;
[OPEttiNG.STAIEMENTS.BYCOUNSEL]] .
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED]
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22.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE

The cleric has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages,'Which-. ,•
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the .particular laws-or r- .
rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number'twenty- two (22), .We will now. read those instructions.:
".-' Y
' • ' . ' . ; . '..::\
23.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE :JURY ROOM

You may-take the following things with-you when you go into the jury room to discuss.-. •
this case:

24.

a.

All exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

Your notes (if any);

c.

Your copy of these instructions; and

d.

The verdict form or forms.

NOTES

The use of notes in the jury-room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let
.me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a yerdict
independently, after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely
because that juror has taken notes.
25,

SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION

When you go into the jury room, your first taslc is to select a. foreperson. The foreperson
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed, The
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors.
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important.
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up.
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that youi; mind cannot be
changed. Each of you must decide the* case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with
your fellow jurors.
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..

•, •

Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you. .••.••;.-. _•
should not surrender your honest, convictions just to end the deliberations or to. agree with.-.ofher • - • ' . : . . .
jurors. ..
••
•
•...-;.,..

.•.•--:;.- :. • -. 26.- . :WBATTODOIFTOU'-HAVE-QXJES!H^

'.

\ -<, ,:r ^,:-v:•:-.

.-• . • ;-ffyoUthh^youneedmore
. .*..„:.•»: •••
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate.- .
• -v. •'
••: • • However; these- instractions should- cphtain all the information you need to reach-a verdict-based : jy. :-..- : ••. -. :
upon the evidence. • '
'
• . - , • ; . ..-.;.. v27.

FOCUS.ONTHIS'CASE.ALQNE'- '

••

••

;

w -

: ,;.,v.:-, • }"</. : - . - ; <•:.

Your duty is to decide this case and this, case alone. You should not use this case-as a
• '•
forumfor correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing'.'individual ox '•-.•••: .. ...
• collective views- about anything other thari the issues you are called upon to- -decide.; .Your, verdict • •
'' should reflect the facts .as found by you applied to the law as explained 'in HIGBO instructions and
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.-, '
•...''••...'
Thefinal.test of the.qualify of your service willbe-the verdict you return. You will. . .
contributeto'efficient-judicial, administration if-you focus exclusively on this case -and return a • .
just and proper verdict
• . • • • ' . ' • '

.28. . .DO NOT SPECULATE OR RESORT TO CHANCE •'

.

>

•"When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's-opinions at •.. •
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence.
. If you-decide that a-party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts • suggested, evaluate
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement .on the amount. •
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates.
29..

AGREEMENTON SPECIAL VERDICT

I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single, question.
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have stm and heard during this trial,
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least
six jurors must agree on'the answer to the question.
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you havefinished.The bailiff will escort you
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you,
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30.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER-TEE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED '• . \ •

After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the clerk, may ask each of you about it to malce sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box; and you may Leave
.at any time.: You-may.remain in the courtrooms?you- wish to watch the rest -of the proceedings, • - •
which should be quite brief.
. . - ' . . • •
After you are excused, you may talk about the-.case with' anyone. likewise, you are not • •
• -required t<5 tallcabout it If anyone attempts to talc to you::aboiit the -case when you :don:-twantto .
do that, please tell the court cleric or bailiff.
.'-.-.
.'
. 31..

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS'

. ' • . ' " '• •'•<'' "

This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private' property of the defendant, landowners for. a ,
public purpose. The party commencing this action,.'known as the plaintiff, is the Utah. ••...'••••
Department of Transportation, and the property .owners^-known as the defendants, are JamesIvers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include .the value of
the loss of viewfromthe defendants' property;
32.

OWNER TESTIFYING-

The-defendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants* testimony on the value of the
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal
involvement^ the: defendants' specific knowledge of the property, and the defendants5 experience
and qualifications to testify regarding land value,33.

TAKING

.

la this case, -the condemnation or taking" involves a parcel of kad which was
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs project to expand and elevate U.S.
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane in Fannington, Utah.
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a
reasonable right to receive air and lightfroman adjacent public highway and a view from their
property.
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in the "after
condition" than the "before condition"-because of a loss of view, then you may award damages
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain
and not contingent, remote or speculative.
' •

\
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A property owner adj oining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing'
traffic.
34.

LOSS'OF VIEW

-

.

'

.

in this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss .of view is to be measured by t h e ^ ^ d •
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the m a r k e ^ ^ S
df^^faBl'ofSef^rty.
'
.
*™==*^^
35...

DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY P E ^ ^

. The measure, of damages for permanent injury to land is.the difference in the fair-market
value' of.the land immediately before and- after the injury. This is called "diminution m value."" *
36. . FAIR MARKET VALUE

.

• Pair market value is the highest-probable price-estimated in terms of money that land
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with areasonabletime allowed in which to
find'abuyer with knowledge of .all the uses- and purposes'to which the land was adapted....
• In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willmg buyer wouldhavepdd
wilting seller in ail aims-lengfhtransaction with both-pBitiosbeing folly informed concerning all ."
of the advantages and disadvantages to thepropeity, .and with neither acting under any
compulsion to buy or sell. . •
• : . . . • '
•In this case you are to determine the fair market value of the-loss of viewfrom.the
defendants' property.
• ' • . • •
37.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in
value of the subject property.
38. * COMPARABLE SALES
Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of Hie loss of view from the defendants'
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in
determining fair market value of the property in dispute.
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39.

JUST COMPENSATION

The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants5 property because of public
necessity, hi this case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of viewfromthe
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value'of the loss of view from
the defendants' property.
40.

COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES

In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property by determining the fair market value as of December 30s 2002.
41.

INTEREST

You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such "interest to the compensation
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law.
.1
42.
LOSS OF PROMTS
In arriving at your detemirnatidn of fair market value of-the subject property, you shall
not consider alleged injury to -any business or business operation conducted on or about the
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants'
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of
profits are not recoverable., but maybe considered as bearing upon estabhshing the market value
of the subj ect property.
43.

HIGHEST AM) BEST USE

The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for
which the property was reasonably adapted on Hie date of taking, without limitation to the use
that was actually made of the property. The highest and best use means its most advantageous
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably
foreseeable future. The term "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be
put to a particular use except for the taking.
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the
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•

^property at the 1me (rf^
. .. :t. ••,.;...-..
probable as to have an. effect on the fair market value of the land at the time, of taking.. A purely •, .•-. -;. *:• .,;•. : •
.... imaginative'or.speculate
• , "..•
..v.;-...'.... ••..••/ -.-: ; :^- : o^..' , o.:;''.
-. ••-.... ..In-determining highestand best use^youmay take into consideration-: (1) the aGtaal.use.of--^v-;^ ;.'v. .:
the property-at the datefixedfor evaluation; (2)'its location; '(3).its topography;-.(4) the use pf the' '* • •. •.
• \suirounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoning-of the property at the time in. ••,•'. •• ? - :.,::. * •
•.questions ortheiack thereof; (6) the availability;of water and uiility facilities .as-.ofthat time; (7) •.-• .•..:••.• •'••
] market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable -property.in j. ••; . .• ,.:s ' •
. • the general, area; and. (9)/.any other factors-wMch you bdieve the-M
:
• seller would take into account infixingthe' probable itself the subject property, as o'fDec'ember- • • '••...:• ..-: •".;.
,.• ;3;0?20'02;x}rv^^
, • ••
• • . . . • •>;.. ••':\ • ... ;.•-. -•:'..-. s •.,./• ,..••-..•..
• 44. '..ACCESS

•

: .. You.are instructedihat the use -of.the -highways and 'Streets may beJimited, c'ontrolled'and'-.... \. . . .regulated by 'the exercise of the .police .power .to the extent-necessary to promote.the'health, safety ,. .
•and welfare- of the public. However, the-right to enter .and. leave a person.5 s land cannot be entirely • ' . • •
cut offJ?ree-and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient.
, access prior to the'enactment of the regulation.
•'
'• ;45. ;;SPECDLATIVE-COMPENSATION' '•'
• "' in determining just 'compensation, you are not to take into consideration'imaginative or.
speculative values or damages- You'are.not to consider, the price for which the property would
sell.under special or extraordinary .circumstances, but only such values that axe real and supported
' by the evidence.
. 46. ': • VIEWING OF PROPERTY You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and apphcability of the testimony and
evidence introduced in this trial.
Your view of the. property is not evidence, in and of itself upon which a verdict may be
based. You may use it' only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses.
47.

SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

The plaintiff has a legalrightto condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of viewfromthe defendants' property.
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. 48..

SETTLEMENT 0E VALUEOFPROPERTY . :

•

..:,.,..

. . . . : • • .,<•;•

. . . .Tlie-p'arties'-have aheady reached agreement on the fair market value. of .the property taken
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been fully paid this value. . ••....•
« • • The .purpbj&e of this- trial is to determine if the landowner is.to receive any additional -.
compensationfor the value, of the loss of view from -their property. You are to. determine that. .•
dollar value, if any. •' • . , . . ' • . . . . *. ••••...,> . . . •
. •, .
•49.-: ARGUMENTS .OF COUNSEL NOT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES . •..;/:..,,•-> -.-.
• Yo'u-may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in decidmg the .amounts, of •
damages, but their arguments are not evidence.
.
• • .•
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Donald X Winder #3519 •
John W.Holt #5.720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 "West 200 South. #4000
P.O.Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 • •
Attorneys-far Defendants
IN THE SBCOHD JHDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND F0JRDAY3S COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
.. "MEMORANDUMTN-SUPPORTOF .
' DEFENDANTS.M0fIONWLMINE AND
MOTION'TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J.'
PHELLTF COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT

UTAH-DEPAKTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, ..
•plaintiff,vs.

Civil No. 020700665

JAMES T7ERS; ICATHERME G. HAVAS, /
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant)

Judge Michael Allphin

Defendants.
Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through, counsel, hereby
respectiully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion
to Strike Portions of J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal.
INTRODUCTION
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiff s ("tTDOT") construction
project to elevate U;S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah, After a lengthy appeals
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Arby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to
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support the severance damages claim. UDOThas attempted through various motions to preclude
Arby-sfrom'recoveringdamages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines, Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages
resultingfromloss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from
lay witnesses not qualified as'experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information-'he •
obtainedfrom,lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to
form their conclusions. Further/the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opini oris-have •
not been .disclosed to Arby's; 'Relevant portions • of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market;
'Participant Interviews/' pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A."" Cook..should not be'.
pamutted-to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay'and lay opinions, He should '
also be excludedfrom-,testifying based upon irrelevant data.
.••'

•
. ' "

•

.......

• ARGUMENT
POINT!'

..

COOK RELIES UPON INADM3SSABLE HEARSAY
Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of
fiie subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A." This is problematic for numerous reasons. First,
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements
offered for the truth of the matter asserted Rule 801(c), UTAH R. Evm. Hearsay is generally

2
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inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. BVHX Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any
of the exceptions to the hearsay role under Rule 803, UTAHR, BVID, l
The Utah .Supreme .Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness 'based his
opinion in part -on out of court statements, cc[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked
in the form of an -expert opinion,- would have -been impemiissible and potentially highly
prejudicial." .Edwards v. Didericlcseiit'597 P.2d 1328L, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay -evidence
is clearly not admissible at trial. •
••"-'"

' ••

• ' • . ' . .
:
:

PQ3NT2-

.
•

'

' . • ' • ' * '

•.:"

• While some .-of Coolers interviewees are named., many, of "them are not identified and-are
.only referenced vaguely .and generally. For example/ on page:51, Cook .-says -he spoke wife "the
managers .of several fast-food restaurants,.." Exhibit "A5?. On page 52, he states: ccWe also
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he
allegedly spoke.
Moreover, insufficient infonnation is provided concerning the background and
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the

1

The mt&rviow material is hearsay upon hearsay-to the eztmt Cook relied upon other-partiesto
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into his Appraisal. It
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly
heard from others.
3
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subject real property. What axe their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of .
view any part of their job duties? "These individuals are apparently involved in managing
restaurants/but-they.are notieal estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an-individual
named Treesa Kurtzenbom about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that
Arby's suffered no damage. No- information is. given concerning Ms. Ktortzenborn'-s expertise or
familiarity with the subject property, yet .she freely .speculates and opines that other factors
impacted the value of fee--subject property more.than the view, obstniofion, .There is no •
foundation for such/a -speculative opinion from .a. lay witness and.no explanation forwhy Cookwould incorporate such a-statement from alayiritness, into Ms-own expert "analysis;. This. Court.
-mast insure'that an "expert'witness is truly testifying as -an.expert and not-merely serving as a
conduit through which 'inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier,
•468 F.3d 63, 73 (1 st Cir, 2006) -("an expert .witness may-not simply komnxaiize the out-of-court
statements of others as Ms testimony") (citation omitted), . .
It IB clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were asked to render opinions based upon
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; Rule 7G2, UTAHR, EVUX reserves such testimony
to experts wbo bave the requisite fi<knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Id.
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expect or otherwise,
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R, BVID., to the witness's own
perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of
Cook's'interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses.

4
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Defendants have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals
Coolc interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants .should be given the opportunity to
•draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witness
opinions. It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply permit Coot to pass "this untested -and
TinchaUengeidMoxmationontothejuty;
•

'

.

POINT 3

THE IAY OPINIONS UP^^

,

• There are. serious problems with the relevance .of Cook's interview .data'.- As/an example,'
Cook apparently .interviewed an.assistant store manager of .the Smiths store and representatiyes
of"a Burger King- on the east side .of-U.S. 89, across -from the •subject Arby-'s location, * These'
locations are-more .distantfromthe-elevafced US. • 89 .than the Arby's property. The Smith's;store .
is further north, than the Arby's property and. does npt face the highest point of the elevated U.S.
89, Additionally, Coolc fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view
at a grocery .store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on deteixoirring the loss in the
fair market yalue of the subject property. The Cook. Appraisal is replete with this kind of
irrelevant material.

2

Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view.
Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter,
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons
to whom customers would have complained.
5
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POINT 4
'THE MATERIAL COOKRELES UPONE NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER
SEASONABLY BASES OPINIONS
.

t

. • . Rule 703, UTAHR. BVID. states the data upon; which anerpert bases his opinion need not

be admissible in-evidence if--the data is "of a type reasonably reEed iiponby experts/in the.
particular field in forming opinions* „.?5 Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses,
particularly those who have-no familiaritj'-'with the subject-property are-the type of facts or data
.upon "which a licensed-real, estate -appraiser would' reasonably rely to. value property Thematerial, which isnot admissible due to-the problems-discussed above, is iiot of the type upon .
.which, an appraiser idlies to appraise real property.' Cook's opinions shotild.be/based-upon the
.standard of Rule 702; UTAH-R. EvrD., rather,than memorialize impermissible lay .opinions'. "
•Therefore, it should he rejected, and to. "the extent -Cook 'has reEed upon that information^ he •
should he excludedfromdiscussing it at trial' •

• • • • - . • "

•;

-.'POINTS-

;

\

" "

;

COOK'S UNDERLYING METHODOLOGY HAS NOT BEEN-DISCLOSED'.

Not only does Cook fail to pro-vide any foundation concerning the qualifications-of the
interviewees to render opinions, but he provides no information about the methodology of the
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject property with iQspQot to
the view issue? "What questions were asked? "What is the identity of persons interviewed who
are not discussed in the Cook Appraisal? What individuals ?vere interviewed who are not

6
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mentioned in the report? "What infonnafion was obtained through the interview process -that
contradicts -Code's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews?
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were
interviewed. At a minimum, pursuant to Rub 705, UTAHE.. EVID., if for some reason the Court
permits Cook to rely 'upon this data,-all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions should
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial.
•

•,-•' .

- .

•'

• , ' : • ' . • '• ..POINTS

• :

•

'

\ '

' •

.-

With the concerns referenced.above, 'Cook9 s opinion does not meet the standards required
under Role'702.- That Rule,in relevaMpart^pfp-vides:^

'

'•

• ' . ' . ,

(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialised knowledge may
.serve as the basis for .e^erttest^
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data,' and (pi) have been reliably applied to the
facts of the case.
• •(o) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community

As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UlAHR. E m is
to be applied to "all .expert testimony!" The Note continues by explaining that, just as in federal
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper' responsibility to screen out unreliable

7
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expert testimony." To MfiU this role, the -Note advises that the trial judge should "confront
proposed' expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible
evidence that may bear on reliability.". ,
• -

Because .Cook .relies upon irrelevant hearsay'opinions from lay witnesses,'Ms opinions

are unreliable. Defendants • submit the -Court, acting as gatekeeper, should- exclude .such
testimony-and^evidence at ."trial; •
"•

. • • • ' . ' '

•' • CONCLUSION- •

..

'•*''•'

Based upon .the' foregoing, portions of.J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal-.should be stricken and he
should -not be permitted-to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay- •
opinioiL

•

\A'••
.

/yfii.•-.•..•••,-•••

. . DATED ABZ/M

•

day of March, 2010

.
"WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

maid 1 -Winder
[Fo3pW.Holt
Vttomeys 'for Defendants
r

8
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SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

PRQPERTY.GWNED BY JAMES IVERS
' (ARBY'S RESTAURANT)
Parcei Number 269
Project No. 5TP-0067(1)0

Located at
. ±1253 North. Highway 89
Farmmgforv Davrs County, Utah.

PREPARED FOR:
\ •; •..STATE;OF-.UTAH"." :
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LGCG
March 3, 2010

Mr, Randy Hunter •
Assistant Attorney General
. State .of Utah
. '
1
1 SO East 300 South, 5" Floor '
Salt lake City, Utah 84114-0857'
Re:
' '

•

• .
••;...•

... ,

'

Appraisal: A partial taidngbf the view out property right appurtenant to land owned
by James Ivers, e t .at: (Arby's Restaurant), located' at ±.1253 -.North' Highway 89,
Farmington, -Davis County, Utah, -Parcel No. 269. of Project No: STP-0D67(1)O. ' •

Dear Mr. Hunter:

• •

As you knew, on September 4, 2003,-we provided an "appraisal addressing mafkk value of/
the .taking <of -land 'and site/improvements from th'e. above-referenced .property. That .
appraisal, which-addressed the value of ifej proper-taken, .severance 'damages and "benefits,
'was "the basis for''negotiations that resulted in'settlihg'the -majority :of -issues' regarding the
property owner's claimfor-ca'mpensatidn/./Specific^li^the'parties have reached-settlement
"on the -value of-the property /actually taken .and claimed severance damages .relating 'p the
taking of landscaping thkleftthe-propertyriori-confdrming relative to zoning. . " '
The Court has 'heard and ruied'bn the-owner's claim .that tost visibility/exposure and reduced
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the properly. The Court ruled that
property owners have no appurtenant- rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access-in
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the-owner's claim that
lost--view-out reduced value of the property, its conclusion was that view, from a. property
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto
must be addressed • .
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has
been paid.

201 South Main, Suite 45,0, Salt lake Qly, UT B477T
main a01-364>6233 fax 801.3S4.6230 wwwJecg.cam
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Page Two

As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of t h e data, reasoning,
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process t o develop an opinion of value. The
depth of-discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the '
' intended use stetad within this report.
~
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Sta.ndB.rds of Professional
Appraisal Prs.c£\ce (USPAP) as .'promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation;
The valuation date is December 30,2002; which is the date of Service of .Summons. 'After
'•careful consideration, and analysis of available information, -we are of the ppiiHion that market •'
• value of the subject is not negatively affected; by the reduced view o u t Therefore; no
• compensation beyond that already paid-for the taking and claimed severance damages for
lost landscaping is concluded,- •/
>
this-conclusion is subject to'assumptions and "limiting conditions contained-in the report •
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish -Its intended function. Please call if we can be^ of •'
•further.assistance. •'••"•/'.'*. ."'.•'• ': \ • -•':"
'•
• ' ' • .::-.'•".-' ' • .'..
•Respec^Tiliysubmiifed/-- : •."•'.. . ' V ; \ . / ' ' *'' "'

jJ.PhffipCook^MAI-CRE .•
LECG, LLC, Director * .." .,
Utah State - 'Certified General Appraiser '.
Certificate 5451057-CG0G 'Expires 06-50-11

•'•'•••...' •..*'.'••...'•.

Richard C. Sloan
.: .'.•
LEGG, LLC,.Appraiser
Utah iSfcate.- Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 570Z759-CG0Q Expires' 11 -30-11"

2Q1 South Main, Suite 450; SattUke City- VT mm
main 801364-6233 fez 801354.5230 www.lecg.com
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CERTJRCAT/ON

LECG

CERTIFICATION.
We certify that we have made-an investigation and analysis of the following property;
Property Owned by James Ivers, et. al.
{Arbyrs Restaurant)
' located at .±1253 North-Highway 89 •
Farmington, Davis County, Utah
Davis County Assessors Parcel No, 08-051 -0097
We certify thattothe best of auricnowledge and belief:
The statements of fact contained in this-repork are true and correct
The reported -analyses,-opinions, and conclusions are limited-only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our
.peraonat/imparn^^ndunbiEised^
' '•
'We.have no presenter prdspecfaye "interest in the.property that Is the-subject of this report, and we have no. persona] interest with
.3.'
.respect to the paro'eslnvoiyed;' •
... \
.. ' .
•
-4 '
••••/•.•./•
W&'have no.pnssent or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report'and no personal interest with respect to.'
the parses involved- <
', .•
• .'
5, " We have no'biaswlthTespectto-the property that is'the subject of.this reporter to the parties involved .with this assignment
6;
•Our engagementIn'tHis assignment'was not conBngsntupon developing^ reporting predetermined results."
7.
Our cprnpensarionior completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of..a predetermined value- or
direction In value 'that-favors the cause of the.client, the amount of.the value qpinionr the attainment of .a stipulated result, or the
occurrence ofe'subsecjuent event directly relatedtothe intended use qf.this appraisal, .
. The reported''analyses, 'opinion's, and .candusiqns -were -deveiapad, .and 'this report/has been prepared :in cpnformlty with the
requirements of'the Code of- Professional .-£mics.& Standards-of Professional appraisal-'Practice of the Appraisal institute, .which ''
.include ibk'timbrm Standards- of Professional Appraisal Practice
*
•
'.••"'•
9..
'Weihave made an inspection of 'the property;that'is'the -subject of .this-report .
*
10.
NDX3ne^provldedprafessiona|'.assistance in preparing this report' ."
'.
.
11/
J. Philip'Cook has-completed the requirements ofthe continuing-education program of the Appraisal Institute,12.. The value .'conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are -not based on a requested minrmum valuation, a specific
valuation, or the/approval of a'bank
•
ia.
Qursfcate appraisal cerfificaBans have notbeen revoked, suspended,, canceled, or restricted.
14.
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and-experience to complete the assignments a
:
competent manner. 'The reader is referred to the appraisers' 'Statement of Qualifications, '
•15.
J. Philip Cook is currently a'Certlfied General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451 Q57-CG0Q;
16,
Richard C, Sloan is currency a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #57D7759-CG0D
' '
1.
"2.

Dated: March 3 , 2 0 1 0

um^nA^ t J^e^u.
|j. Philip Cook, MAI CR.E
LECG, LLC, Director
Utah State- Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 54S1057-CGOO Expires 06-30-71

! Richard C. Sloan
LECG, LLC, Appraiser

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 57Q7759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11
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Market Participant Interviews

•.

.

We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug -and the owner of
Burger King/ which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject
Similar to'the subject; both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to-the
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject
.Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the. lack of view out of the storewas not:an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view. • ' He said that business had increased 20- percent'over the past year -and .25 percent .or more '•
over the past two years.'

/

•

' . ' • ' • . • . - ' :

" • : ' ' • ' ' " • ' • . •,

Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store:said'that he •"
and his parbier/Iorn Long, purchased the store In.-2004, -after the construction-of the,-,
overpass; He said that the view of the. overpass from -the Testaurantbad no -bearing on- the' - .
purchase-of the .-property .including the purchase price;-"nor'did "the newly ^constructed "
overpass have any impact in general,

' '. ./•

, •

••;•.'•

.Adam Hawkes ' with NAi Utah in layton, who -is assisting in .redevelopment-of the .
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west pf the subject, said that no one cares •
what they are looking at once they get insrde the -building. Likewise, Nick Mason with OB V
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is .exposure.
Mason.* is currently listing a-pad.-siteior.sale..located .qear-the-GBQ-North/W 5 .interchange.in.. . .
Clearfield The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with M5 raised up just to the east to
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price,
but no consideration' was given for the obstructed view out to the east by th e freeway,

We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of
Carl's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's jr., Taco Bell and Arby's m CenfervflJe,
and 1CFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street All of'thesefest-foodrestaurants abut a
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freeway overpass ar raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business.
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the
restaurant feces east with the raised freeway located across the street t o the east The
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as ft was across the
street She also said that customers-could seeihe mountains to the east over the overpass.
The regional manager fovArbf at this store, Matthew .Martin, said that traffic and exposurewere the important Issues. Martin said that *once'the customers were Inside the store it
didn't really matter what the view was.

•

. '

..

The layout .of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was.-constructed around'1993, is
similar-to the iayout of the subject; joe -Rich, the property's developer with 'Woodbury •
•Corporation, said he does,not remember view out-being discussed in any way. He said that

The .property owner -of the Clearfield -Arty's,. Tneesa Kurtzebom, said that t h e raised-freeway
was hota factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both*'
.a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure'and. proximity to an • off-rampas positives. She did not mention what the negatives-were but said that the raised freeway
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurfzeborn said that in purchasing the
property..she Jo.olced more. atwJfiat the .surroun.dingiievejqp.menJ: was..ap,dJheJypR.of.draw. ,.
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a
major draw to the center.

Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north,
purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr^Burt, his store has not been
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once

PRQHERTY OWNED BY JAMES MRS - AREY'S RESTAUMNT/03^201 OSL
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customers figured out how to -use the interchange upon completion of construction, his
business -quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically
• not view out. Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of
expanding his store .upon termination .of the lease in.2017.

•

We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fest-fopd chains concerning site •
' selection criteria and view out fcuss Smith, the site selection' manager for Wendy's, said that'
view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it-becomes a negative,, such as looking
at a -garbage dump. 'With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view .is
neutral' Smith said that the primary concerns are access -and exposure, with demographics,
also playing a role, and he would have no .problem -siting a.'restaurant near an overpass as it .
.may mean "better exposure. . "He-noted that the view'out from the Wen cfy's,, restaurant in •
. Centerville isof a.gas-station tothe.north.and otherremiidevelopmentto/the west-and-e^ ':'..'
•• Smith also .said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons'
• •kesitningfora'nhour.or'mora .

•• ... '

• .:.••'.

.

•:"''.

iisa'Sbaw, the-western region site selection manager, with Carl's Jr.,5aid t h a t view out is no£
an issue as iorig as- it is not bad,- such as an aduit entertainment establishment Shaw said ..
that the main criteria considered in site selection .relates .to lot size, demographics, price,.
• access, and visibility. She said that she tries to .site the restaurants by other retailers- or
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she
. can.,get.p.B0.p!]e in. tbe door, $ really doesn't matter what fteyj/iewMlifeJn.the store., irrthe.,
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most Shaw
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it
Although access was unchanged; it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road
hurt the business,

We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously.
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass
of surrounding development, and-tries to negotiate reciprocal parking.

With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albert very minor. -He said there are
many locations .that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the
view. According to Langran, customers are notrnteresfcedan what they are looking at outthe
window. He said whiiea view of the mountains may be -nice, it is not-critical.

in addition, Langran said that loss of exposure .affects the impulse buyer which HS roughly 20 '
• percent of the business; ..He-said that office--.or residential customers fiat-are either return or.
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located
and'kn ow the 'backway into the. property,. ;•

•.

•• \ ,-";'•• •'•"

•"

...

.•For •additional .support, photographs of various .-properties" with .obstructed • views .in- one or •
two -directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented *rn the /addenda.
The .majority of th£se properHes;were :buiit:with the view obstruction already in place,.and
there -is no evidence-any of the properties' values wens affected by the impaired view out

Conclusion

The paired' data analysis*is quite"conclusive'that'retail properly',values"are,''nof imp~ac±ed
negatively by the loss of view out this is also the overriding consensus among teal estate
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's
value.
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under the bridge?

2

A.

3

Q.

4'
. 5
6
•

7

Yes.
.Okay, let's look at slide.30, showing the distances.

You've indicated" that"- the distances, on the averag-e, are a
little bit shy ;of 200 feet?
A.

•11
1-2

'

It's about''65 feet from the property 'line to the

" •

Q. • Okay'.

10

."

Yeah, 192 is what we measure- from the store/- itself,

to. the wall.
wall. '

•

'.

• •

Is it reasonable to review -- to re;fer to this

as a. ^partial view impairment"?.

••....•

' .

A- • ".Certainly it/s only.; a partial- vi:ew impaix-rnent.'
•There's .'no --

''.',,

.' -.'

•

...

•

.'

. '

:13.

Q.'

14

A. ' —'.there'; s no'material view, impairment in. most

.15',

; There' s .not a total-, view impairment? •"
• '

directions, but to the east there is .a partial view impairment.

16

Q.

17

A. . It.can be.

18

Q.

What type of real estate is view important to?

19

A.

Resort hotels overlooking the ocean, a.view would be

Is view ah important. amenity for real estate? •
•

20

very important-

21

an amenity for which buyers will pay a premium.

High end homes in resort settingsr a view is

22

Q.

How about industrial properties?

23

A.

Industrial properties are not bought for view out..

24

Most industrial buildings don't have windows.

25

they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial

They're
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-19
buildings are typically designed for either storage where
they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well
as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't
have windows/ or it's manufacturing, where they don't want
employees to be looking out the window while they're —

while

they're working, for safety purposes.
Q.

How about the view in, visibility; is that important

to an industrial property?
A.

It can- be.

Q.

Why is that?

•A.

Well, some industrial businesses are —

a what we call -a * showroom warehouse."

they'll have

So like a lot of home

construction materials companies like tile companies will
like to advertise and get people into their showroom.

They

are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the
homeowner's picking out the goods.

So if they can be exposed

to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that
can help their business.
Q.

Is it customary for them to put -some —

their name or

some advertising on the outside of the building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Does that contribute —

that visibility contribute to

an industrial property?
A.

An industrial user that is worried about —

or is

hopeful to get some recognition from'the marketplace, that's
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1

exactly what they want to do.

2

Q.

It provides some name recognition?

3

A..

Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that

4

.

don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial

.5

users where there's some advantage-t.o that disability.

;6

'•'Q.

So .the'visibility in is. different than the visibility

7 . out.; is that what you're saying?
•S

A.
•Q.

9 •'•

Significantly.-

.

.
• '

• ..
.

03cay, how about fast food restaurants.;' is. view' out an

10-- important amenity'.to a fast food restaurant?

11 .,

•'

'• A.. ' It' is-'not. " It wasn't listed, in the .criteria of site

12 •' seie'-ction •f.ox fast food.-.operators. -It. •wasn't, s offle thing ' that in13 : my varied -discussions, with individuals .who' axe. inwolve.d in that.14

business .identified as-an is.sue.' 'I've also studied it -with

.15

specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity ••that fast

16' food restaurants care about.
17

Q.

18

' A.

19

• •''

Where are fast' food restaurants typically .-located?
They are typically located along freeway interchanges

or in front of shopping centers.

Ideally, both.

20

Q.

Is that for their convenience?

21

A.

Right, it's for convenience, it's.for visibility, it's

22
23
24
25

for accessibility.
Q.

I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently

located at highway/freevfay intersections.
A.

They are.
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Why is this data coll ection process so important to an

MAI appr aisei•?
A.

You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but

their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base
their opinion.

We have a standards obligation, an ethical

obligation to provide appraisal work in a non -Q.

Want to pull the microphone back towards --

A.

—

in a non-misleading way, and to prove our —

prove

our opinions*' Wot just to pull something out -of the air, but
to actually prove our opinions.

Even though there's a lot of

anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not
something these fast food operators particularly care about,
we need to go to the market to confirm that.
Q.

So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in

forming j'our opinions?
A.

"Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my

sole reliance.
Q.

Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case

studies?
A.

That I cannot is —

I cannot find in the marketplace

where this changed the subject's situation, specifically
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court,
that just th'is view impairment has no impact on market value.
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Q.

That's the conclusion of your data?

. 2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Is -that supported by your other research"?

4-

A.

It is.

5

Q.

-Does it surprise you .that yo,u couldn'-t- ."find any -value '*

.6 for' that view -out?
7

A.

It doesn't.'

.'Q.

.Why is that?

. •. •

•"..'•'"

•••''..••

•

'• .

'

...•'•

•'•'•.

>

'

A. " Because of how common it .is in this imperfect world '.

10. 'that —'that view impairment, especially ,in situations next to*'
1.1- the highway, where you're ' trying, to., attract "high-way business,
12

how.common.that is, and'why. a business'would .locate"" in* that-'

13

situation if

14

So. r'm. not'surprised bj

15

•Q-.

i't were — : if .it were .that critical of a '.factor ', .. •..the results; , •

Vi

••

•• '. -.•.••;•'.'•••••

-Now, I've asked you to look, at a boob-by Misters •'

16

Bell- and Oral Anderson, published' by the American —

17

Appraisal- Institute, ' titled '""-Real .Estate Damages.". Have you

18

looked at that book?

•

or. the

.

19

A.

20

• Q.

21

A.

I am

22

Q.

In fact, I had the. first edition, and you gave me the

23

Yes,
You're familiar with that book?

second edition; is that right?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

A newer mod —

newer version *of it.

Is this approach
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A.

I did.

2

Q«

You obtained anecdotal evidence

3

A.

4

Q.

5
6

—

Yes.
—

from market participants; and based upon that

effort,- that research, what was your conclusion?
A.

I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any valu-e, loss

7

or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out

8

to the east, or this fast food restaurant property.

910

MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, might I approach
for a moment?

11

THE COURT: P l e a s e .

12

(Discussion at t h e bench off the record)

13

Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: So j u s t t o conclude, i t

is

your

opinion t h a t t h e view out from t h e A r b y f s

14

professional

15

r e s t a u r a n t has no monetary value?

16

A,

Correct.

17

Q.

Thank you. If you can stay, because we're going to

18

need to review some of these, i£ that's okay?

19

A.

I guess so.

20

Q.

I don't know how you got that set up. All right,

21

thank you. Thank you.

22
23

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. WINDER:

24

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Cook.

25

A.

Good morning, Mr.' Winder.
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A.

Yes, that's my testimony.

2

Q.

Ail right, and —

and it's 20 to 22 feet high?

3

A.

yes.

•

•

4

• .Q.

.5

A.

6

,'•' Q.

'.

H O W wide is- this?

.

?'"

direction. .'
Q:-.

l i - ' (.where
•12 ;

.

.

.'.••.

•

•

. • ' . - '

i b'elieve'i-t has' two- lanes of traffic 'in each
•

•

••

•"' •

'..

.

.'..-.•

All rights and how loag is., this' obstruction, from

to. .where? , "How 'long-does it run?---

• A.

'•

It's quite a .distance. ' It's g.ot how many • la-iies .of-

V-

10

.

I don't know. . - . ' • '

7 •traffic in each'direction.? .
,- A-

•

•

'How l.ong-'is tire road,'or how/long is.-the —

-. '
.'.''•'.'

•Q.. -'.Elevated-.' , How long lis the. road as -elevated'here?'

is; '•

.A.'

Probably three-quarters a-mile to the north and a half

mile to the south.

is.;
1.6
17

Ho, actually it probably continues elevated

even beyond a half m'ile .to the south.
Q.

Okay, now we — >we agree that view is a component of

value for at least some properties?

18.

A.

ITes.

1?

Q.

All right, and an example would be a res —

20

/
a single

family residence in a mountain resort?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

It could also be an office building where someone may

23

want to- look at the Wasatch- and pay a little more rent., as

24

opposed to looking at a building right next door; could be in

25'
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-51that kind of situation?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right, it could be.as individuals.

If we wanted

to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the —

or the bay

than something else?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

So a buyer, renter or tenant in these

situations may pay more for a view?
A,

Yes.

Q.

Our disagreement, Mr.. Cook, in this case, is

ultimate issue.

with the

That is, does the- impairment of view that's

been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage
because of it.

That's our difference.

A.

Yes, that's why we're here.

Q.

That's why we're here, okay.

some of these —

and I'm sorry, I —

Now, let's talk about
a copy of the slides that

I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than
yours.

Xn purple and at my age, there's —

no way I can read-that, but if

I'm sorry, there's

—

A.

If you tell me what- it is, then I'll

Q.

Thank you very much.

—

1 appreciate that.

So let's

let's review some of these slides, and talk about them.
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel.
teeny, tiny.

We had it there, yeah.

Good.

—

I'm on

My copies are

I can't read the
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I hereby certify that on the Q

day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Appellants5 Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brent A. Barnett

OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O.. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
D. Jason Hawkins
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

fcWald J, Winder

Whn W.Holt
Attorneys for Axoicus
Curiae James Ivers,
Katherine Havas and P and
F Food Services
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

, !TA „ A „ FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

-00O00-

A p R 2

Utah Department of
Transportation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20100511-SC
James Ivers; Katherine G.
Havas; and P and P Pood
Services,
Defendants and Appellants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Appellee's motion, filed on
March 28,2012, for an enlargement of time to file their response to
Appellants' Motion for Summary Disposition filed in the above-entitled
matter.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the motion is granted. The Appellees
response to the Motion for Summary Disposition is due to be filed with
the Utah Supreme Court on or before April 18, 2012.

For The Court:

T)dtte\Q^uZ

<2~f <^&/"£-

PatH. Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 2, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental
mailing to be delivered to:
DONALD J. WINDER
JOHN W.HOLT
WINDER & COUNSEL PC
460 S 400 E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
BRENT A. BURNETT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 5TH FL
PO BOX 140858
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858
Dated this April 2,2012.

B

7
^X^^^MJ
Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20100511
District Court No. 020700665
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SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT)
Parcel Number 269
Project No. STP-0067(1)0

Located at
±1253 North Highway 89
Farmington, Davis County, Utah

PREPARED FOR:
STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

Submitted by:
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE
Director, and
Richard Sloan, Appraiser
LECG, LLC
201 South Main Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561

EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE:
December 30, 2002
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LCCG
March 3,2010

Mr. Randy Hunter
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-085 7
Re:

•.•••.•

Appraisal: A partial taking of the view out property right appurtenant to land owned
by James Ivers, et a!. (Arby's Restaurant), located at ±1253 North Highway 89,
Farmington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No. 269 of Project No. STP-0067(1)0.

Dear Mr. Hunter:
As you know, on September 4, 2003, we provided an appraisal addressing market value of
the taking of land and site improvements from the above-referenced property. That
appraisal, which addressed the value of the property taken, severance damages and benefits,
was the basis for negotiations that resulted in settling the majority of issues regarding the
property owner's claim for compensation. Specifically, the parties have reached settlement
on the value of the property actually taken and claimed severance damages relating to the
taking of landscaping that left the property non-conforming relative to zoning.
The Court has heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the property. The Court ruled that
properly owners have no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the owner's claim that
lost-view out reduced value of the property. Its conclusion was that view, from a.property
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto
must be addressed.
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has
been paid.

201 South Wain, Suite 45.0, Salt Lake City, UT 84111
main 801364.6233 fax 801364.6230 www.lecg.com
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Page Two
As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of the data, reasoning,
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process to develop an opinion of value. The
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the
intended use stated within this report.
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice (USPAP) as promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation.
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of Summons. After
careful consideration and analysis of available information, we are of the opinion that market
value of the subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view out Therefore, no
compensation beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for
lost landscaping is concluded.
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report.
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be. of
further assistance.
.
Respectfully submitted,

jj. Philip Cook, MA! CRE
LECG, LLC, Director
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11

Richard C. Sloan
LECG, LLC, Appraiser
Utah State.- Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5707759-CGOO Expires 11 -30-11

201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84111
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.lecg.com
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LECG

CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION
We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property:
Property Owned by James Ivers, et. ai.
(Arby's Restaurant)
Located at ±1253 North Highway 89
Farmington, Davis County, Utah
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051 -0097
We certify that to the best of our knowledge and belief:
1.
2.
3.
. 4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our
personal, impartial, and unbiased professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions.
We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report, and we have no persona! interest with
respect to the parties involved.
We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report and no personal interest with respect to
the parties involved.
We have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this report or to the parties involved with this assignment
Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing.or reporting predetermined results.
Our compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a predetermined value or
direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this appraisal.
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the
requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics & Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute/ which
include the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.
We:have made an inspection of the property that is the subject of this report
No one provided professional assistance in preparing this report
J. Philip Cook has completed the requirements of the continuing education program of the Appraisal Institute.
The value conclusion as well as other opinions-expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific
valuation, or the approval of a loan.
Our slate appraisal certifications have not been revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted.
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and experience to complete the assignment in a
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers1 Statement of Qualifications.
J. Philip Cook is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451057-CG00.
Richard C Sloan is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5707759-CGOO

Dated: March 3, 2010

IWwwX SL ^mu^
|J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE
LECG, LLC, Director

Richard C. Sloan
LECG, LLC, Appraiser

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser

Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11

Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11
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LECG
Market Participant Interviews

We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject
Similar to the sub)edt both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to the
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject.
Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the lack of view out of the store
was not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view.
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and 25 percent or more
over the past two years.

Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store said that he
and his partner, Tom Long, purchased the store in 2004, after the construction of the
overpass. He said that the view of the overpass from the restaurant had no bearing on the
purchase of the property including the purchase price, nor did the newly .constructed
overpass have any impact in general.

Adam Hawkes with NAI Utah in Layton, who is assisting in redevelopment of the
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares
what they are looking at once they get inside the building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what properly users want is exposure.
Mason, is currently listing a..pad.site.for.saIe..locatednear.the-680...North/ir15 .interchange, .in..
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with 1-15 raised up just to the east to
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price,
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway.

We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of
Carl's jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's Jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Center/Hie,
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street. All ofthese fast-food restaurants abut a
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freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business.
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east. The
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the
street She also said that customers could see the mountains to the east over the overpass.
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposure
were the important issues. Martin said that once the customers were inside the store it
didn't really matter what the view was.

The layout of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around 1993, is
similar to the layout of the subject

Joe Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury

Corporation, said he does not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that
Woodbury would not have reduced the price because of the obstructed view.

The property owner of the Clearfield Arby's, Treesa Kurtzeborn, said that the raised freeway
was not a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both
a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure and proximity to an off-ramp
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives were but said that the raised freeway
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurtzeborn said that in purchasing the
p.r.operty~she..looked mote. at.what the. surrounding ..development was..and_thejyp_e..of.draw.
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a
major draw to the center.

Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north,
I

purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been

'

affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once

I

-

1
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LECG

customers figured out how to use the interchange upon completion of construction, his
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically
not view out Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017.

We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site
selection criteria and view out Russ Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that
view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it becomes a negative, such as looking
at a garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view is
neutral. Smith said that the primary concerns are access and exposure, with demographics
also playing a role, and he would have no problem siting a restaurant near an overpass as it
may mean better exposure. He noted that the view out from the Wendy's restaurant in
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other retail development to the west and east
Smith also said that view out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons
are sitting for an hour or more.

Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager with Carl's jr., said that view out is not
an issue as long as it is not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price,
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to site the restaurants by other retailers or
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she
can ..get. people in. the door, jt .really .doesn't matter what they.yiewwM?.Jn. the store., Injhe..
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most. Shaw
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road
hurt the business.

We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass
of surrounding development, and tries to negotiate reciprocal parking.

With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the
view. According to Langran, customers are not interested in what they are looking at out the
window. He said while a view of the mountaiins may be nice, it is not critical.

In addition/ Langran said that loss of exposure affects the impulse buyer which is roughly 20
percent of the business. He said that office or residential customers that are either return or
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located
and know the back way into the property.

For additional support, photographs of various properties with obstructed views in one or
two directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented in the addenda.
The majority of these properties were built with the view obstruction already in place, and
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were affected by the impaired view out.

Conclusion

The paired data analysis is quife"* conclusive that retail property* values "are"* not imp'acted ""
negatively by the loss of view out. This is also the overriding consensus among real estate
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's
value.
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